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DISTINGUISHED PANEL: FACE OFF OR FRESH
START? INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TIMES OF
TURMOIL
Moderator: Christopher Sands
Speaker: Terence P. Stewart
Speaker: John M. Weekes
Speaker: The Honorable Alan Wm. Wolff
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: Okay. If everybody would get back
into their seats, this next panel is going to be excellent. Moderating is Mr. Chris
Sands from Johns Hopkins [University], and I will turn it over to him.
MR. SANDS: Excellent. Good morning, everyone. I am honored to be on a
panel of such distinguished legal experts in the area of international trade.
The first introduction I have to make is to our Henry King awardee, this year
Dick Cunningham, who couldn’t be here, who is the rightful chair for this panel,
really the ghost in the room because he has organized several calls and pulled
ourselves together to talk about the themes, and you will see his fingerprints
sometimes on the conference and I think the quality of the panelists today.
We have three terrific panelists for you. To my right is Terry Stewart who is
managing partner at Stewart and Stewart in Washington, D.C. He has a Harvard
MBA and has a law degree from Georgetown. His practice is focused on trade
remedies, and he is a legend in the D. C. trade community, having worked both
officially and unofficially with the U.S. Government and its various trade bodies
as well as in private practice as one of our leading trade litigators.
To his right is Ambassador John Weekes, well known to the CUSLI
community, the senior business adviser at Bennett Jones, former Canadian
ambassador to the World Trade Organization, proud graduate from the
University of Toronto. He was Canada’s chief NAFTA negotiator and has been a
senior associate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, long experienced with the
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)], then WTO, and now
serves as occasional panelist, WTO dispute panels as well.
To his right is Ambassador Alan Wolff, a senior counsel at Dentons LLP. He
is a graduate of Harvard and has his law degree from Columbia. He is former
Deputy U.S. Treasurer Representative and General Counsel at USTR from the
days before it was USTR. It was just the Office of Special Trade Representative
and served as a lawyer at the U.S. Department of Treasury. He is also—we heard
earlier about Governor Blanchard being [a] Super Lawyer; he is also a Super
Lawyer, giving him extra powers, I suppose, in these states and has, despite a
long and very distinguished career, a particularly important and relevant role,
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now having been a key adviser in stakeholders during negotiations of the TransPacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, yet
to be concluded, so three panelists who bring us a tremendous breadth of
experience from both sides of our border.
I am going to start with Terry, and we will continue from there.
MR. STEWART: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here with you
today and to be on the panel with John and Alan who will carry the heavy lifting.
What my job is to try to explain how the Trump administration trade policy such
as it is has come to be.
I prepared a paper, which is available to you, that walks through my effort to
decipher that, and I think the easy starting point is a slide that I put up, which
tracks the U.S. trade deficit in goods compared to the timing of various trade
agreements that the United States has entered into. And what you see is, if you
go back to the late 1969 when we had a trading surplus, that we have been on a
downward spiral, if you will, and major events would have included NAFTA,
would have included the Uruguay Round, it would have included China’s
accession to the WTO is probably the three major points.
Now, one can say who cares? But the fact that we have gone there, a trade
surplus to a three quarters of a trillion annual trade deficit in goods has been an
issue of great concern to some in the country, including many working class
folks in Midwestern states and states that were pivotal in the last election. When
you couple that with the fact that if you take a look at non-farm income in the
United States on a per capita for a family basis over the last 43 years, there has
been a decline in real dollars of more than ten percent. You had a building storm
of discontent, and neither political party, Democrat nor Republican, were really
postured to understand or grasp that because with the—and trade has been one of
those interesting areas where the trade policy folks inside the beltway for both
parties have been fairly closely aligned with relatively small differences.
And, so, if you look at the last election, you had two outsiders. You had
Bernie Sanders on the left, and you had Donald Trump on the right who raised
this issue about the trade in equities in the system, and that resonated with a lot
of people. So statistically, you can see where the issue is. The U.S. Government
historically has always talked about how many jobs are created by exports, and
they have refused to identify any jobs that have been lost to imports, and so for
people who like to believe that people who are inside the Beltway are
disconnected that face average Americans, stagnant, in fact, declining incomes in
real terms and a very large and globally unheard of, a trade deficit over the years
would create the kind of environment in which somebody who promised to deal
with that problem would receive support, and I would say that the election was a
tipping point in terms of making that a central issue. Lots of discussion as to why
that’s not a valid concern, but for this administration, it is a very important issue.
When you take that down to the individual countries where we have large
deficits, obviously China is at the top of that list, but other important trading
partners where we have big deficits include Mexico, Japan, Korea and Germany,
and if you take those countries alone, you will account for the vast majority of
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the trade deficit, and hence, if you look at the language that has come out from
the administration, the early morning tweets and other identifications of countries
who are, where we have, quote unquote, bad deals. These are the countries who
have been identified, and it is directly tied to the large trade deficit that we have
with those countries.
Further building on what the earlier panel this morning had to say, if you
take a look at auto and auto parts or motor vehicles and parts for motor vehicles,
what you find is, it is the largest part of our trade deficit globally, and for these
five countries, it is the majority and in the case of Mexico more than a hundred
percent of the trade deficit. So if you try to figure out where the Administration
is going and what they are focused on, they are focused on issues that were of
concern in the states, that resulted in the president getting elected, the swing
states in the Midwest and in the East where manufacturing is important. In fact, it
wasn’t until the trade policy 2017, presidential trade policy came out that you
saw anything coming out from the Administration that went beyond
manufactured goods and picked up a small item of agriculture or a relatively
minor part of the economy on the services. So that has been where the focus has
been, and what that has meant is that the government’s focus is on how you
make those deficits disappear.
The negotiations that will go on, at least from the Administration’s point of
view, are intended to try to address that. There had been meetings with industry
groups. Autos were one of the early ones that they had, and it is an effort to try to
identify what do you need changed in the economy so that you will, in fact, be
more like Germany and less like the United States in terms of the large deficit
that we run in autos and auto parts since it drives a lot of manufacturing jobs all
around the world and certainly in the United States.
So you have those things. If you look at the trade policy, there were four
priorities that the Administration identified, the first of which was maintaining
sovereignty over domestic trade policy. This is really a reflection of the
challenges that the United States and other countries, in fact, have faced in the
WTO but what the United States has faced particularly and, in particular, in the
trade remedy arena where 60 percent of the cases that had been brought in the
WTO have been against the United States, who has brought a total of 12 to 13
percent of the trade remedy cases, despite the fact we were a major negotiator in
the Uruguay Round and despite the fact that the agreements in dumping in
Canada largely reflected existing U.S. law. And so the fact that there is concern
in the United States and has been in the Congress for the last 15 years, that the
[WTO] Appellate Body is in some ways uncheckable, which is largely the fault
of how we created the system, is a top priority and a major concern.
The second concern priority being enforcement, strong enforcement of trade
laws. You can’t really have one without the other, but you are seeing executive
orders come out that are trying to address some of the problems that industries
which have had trade problems face. There was an announcement of one coming
out today, that will deal with a problem that has grown exponentially as trade
with China has grown, namely evasion of dumping duties and countervailing
duties, a relatively minor issue in global trade but an important issue for
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industries who have trade remedies in place and are not getting effective
remedies. Custom services GAO put a report out, I think, last year that identified
something like $2.7 billion dollars in duties had not been collected over a tenyear time period. In terms of trans-borders, this is a matter that has been of great
concern to the industries who are affected.
While the Administration’s trade policy may be transactional in nature, an
effort to try to deal with trade deficits, obviously, trade policy negotiations is not
limited; it is not controlled by the executive branch itself but, rather, is a joint
effort with the Congress. And you can see that in terms of what the
Administration’s draft notice of what they would like to do in the NAFTA
renegotiations includes. It includes a whole host of issues that members of the
Senate Finance Committee, House Ways and Means Committee has those
concerns that are part of the trade promotion authority that is out there. So I have
very little doubt that when we finally get to the notification of intent to enter
negotiations with Canada and Mexico, that it will be a broad-based effort. That
broad base will not be a confrontational list in my view. It will been an effort to
expand upon what has been done to deal with new areas such as had been picked
up in the TPP, and one of the interesting challenges is how much of the TPP will
be picked up and included from the United States point of view and how much of
it will be tweaked to address particular problems that various members of the
Senate Finance Committee, in particular, had with the TPP agreement that was
there. And certainly, the issues will be more complex as it relates to our friends
in Mexico than it will be with our northern neighbors.
So I think with that, I will stop and turn it over to John. And thank you very
much.
MR. WEEKES: Well, thank you very much, Terry. That’s a good beginning
and a good outline, I think, of the situation.
Let me start by saying that I am not speaking on behalf of the Canadian
government. I know that’s obvious, but I just want to say that because I
occasionally slip into using “we” as if I was still a government official, and I am
only speaking with the full authority with the rank of citizen. (Laughter.)
Let me start with a few comments because you have set the stage rather
broadly in terms of the United States. Let me start a little bit with Canada and
what I will call the Canadian trade negotiations agenda. Now, before, obviously,
the biggest thing on the horizon perhaps is the renegotiation of NAFTA. But
there are a lot of other things that we are looking at, so let me run through that.
First of all, let me start with the Cabinet because it is quite interesting. You
may recall Chrystia Freeland was our international trade minister, and she then
became foreign minister, and what I don’t think is known by everybody is that
she took with her to the foreign ministry, which is all housed in the same
department called Global Affairs as the Trade Ministry, the responsibility for
Canada-United States trade relations and for NAFTA. So you have Chrystia
Freeland with that file, so the big file. And then you have Francois-Philippe
Champagne, who has been made the Minister for International Trade, and I
hadn’t realized until the dean spoke last night that he studied here at Case,
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studied law. So there is a connection there with our conference. He is a very
active—he has had a lot of very good business experience. He was a vice
president of Asea Brown Boveri, for instance, and he has had a number of
different positions that give him a good perspective on international commerce.
He is ambitious, and he is vigorous, and he has got lots of ideas, and I think his
deputy minister has trouble keeping up with him. So what I am saying here is, we
have got at the top, we have got a minister who is focused on Canada-U.S.
matters and another minister who is sort of free as it were to deal with other parts
of the world.
So what else is going on? Reference has already been made to the fact that,
you know, our agreement with the European Union will come into force
provisionally probably before summer, the start of the summer. And we are now,
of course, looking at what do we do with the United Kingdom. The United
Kingdom is our largest market in the European Union, and clearly, there is
already, while we are not having negotiations, but there are discussions going on
about what do we do when we get to the point of wanting to have an agreement
with the UK that would, at least, maintain and hopefully actually improve on
what is at CETA because, of course, when CETA comes in our agreement with
the European Union, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA,
when it comes into force, the UK will still be part of the European Union. So the
agreement will apply to the UK until such time as the UK leaves. So people need
to plan for that.
We have a Free Trade Agreement with Korea, which has come into force
relatively recently. As was mentioned, we are having—we’ve initiated
exploratory discussions with China to look towards establishing a Free Trade
Agreement. I suspect that’s a process that will take some time, but it has now
been initiated. We very much would like to have a Free Trade Agreement with
Japan, for us, in many respects for the United States as well. The main prize in
terms of what would be new in the Trans-Pacific Partnership is going to be an
agreement with Japan, and we are already feeling the pressure because Australia
has a Free Trade Agreement with Japan, and a lot of their goods are going in on a
preferential basis, so we would like to do that. And we are quite alarmed when
we hear that the United States might do a bilateral agreement with Japan because
that would make this situation we face, it is very unfair, very unfair of
discriminatory trade barriers, and so we are worried about that and how to
manage that, and how to protect and advance our relations with Japan is an
important point. They are a very large trading partner.
We have free trade negotiations going on with India, obviously a significant
country, but those negotiations are in some difficulty because there seems to be a
number of issues, which have come up, which are difficult to resolve. We are
looking at the possibility of having a negotiation with MERCOSUR.
This is a sort of recurring theme, and it sort of depends on the political
constellation in that part of the world, how we look at it. We are looking at what
can we do in Asia now that the TPP isn’t going anywhere for the moment beyond
Japan and China. So you know, the idea is being talked about, looking at
initiating a free trade negotiation with the [Association of Southeast Asian
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Nations (“ASEAN”)] countries and also some thought being given to the free
trade area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), which of course, is an [Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (“APEC”)] initiative, which may not be for tomorrow
given the position of the United States government but is interesting because, of
course, it would actually involve the United States and China as well as most of
these other countries in the region.
So I come back—so there is a lot going on, and the point was made, you
know, we realize that as we realized for some time in Canada that maybe we
need to take a look, take steps to diversify our trade relationships, and I would
say we are trying to do that. It is not going to lead to any miraculous change in
terms of where the most important trade relationships are. You know, I think
forever I suspect the United States will be our principal trading partner.
Now, obviously, the election of Mr. Trump and proposals to renegotiate
NAFTA have captured a lot of attention in Canada, but I think it is important to
recognize that while, you know, we have now seen the draft letter that the
President intends to send to Congress about his intention to initiate a
renegotiation of NAFTA, we don’t know what the final form of that letter would
be, and of course, that’s only a letter still to Congress. It is not a letter to us,
gives some signals about what we may need to be getting ready for, but what we
really need to wait for in terms of, I think, serving as a government reacting
publicly, is what proposals are actually brought to the negotiating table. And
well, I guess we are still, at least, three months away from that because the
formal letter signals a 90-day period which is a minimum, not a maximum, and
so what are we doing? What’s goingon? Well, as you heard, we are now have a
Canadian chief negotiator for the NAFTA. There are consultations going on. I
think it is pretty clear that, you know, they know who they need to consult with
most seriously now, because you can make some judgments about what some of
the focus of this negotiation will be about. So that can be underway; developing
Canadian ideas and proposals. So we are in a state of active preparation but also
sort of a waiting game.
By the way, maybe at this point I will say something: You know, we are
looking at a situation in which, you know, how long a process of renegotiation is
going to take, is a little unclear. Wilbur Ross has said publicly the United States
wouldn’t be ready to sit down and have detailed negotiations until late this year,
this was a couple of weeks ago. Maybe this has changed by now, I don’t know—
hoped that it would be—that it would be possible to conclude those negotiations
within about a year from that date. So we are down—we are right in the middle
of the mid-term elections is where we are, and we are past the Mexican election,
and we are a year from the next Canadian federal election. I am not sure that this
is ideal timing for trying to reach an agreement, but anyway there could be some
problems there. You know, by that time, in fact, depending on how this plays out
in the mix, I have been on a number of panels lately that involve Mexicans as
well, including one in Minnesota earlier this week with Rania Sarah and Carla
Hills, and one of the things that comes up in these discussions just to put Mexico
in the picture for a minute is that the polling in Mexico at the moment shows that
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if the Mexican presidential elections that are scheduled for, I think, July of next
year were held today, that [Andres Manuel Lopez] Obrador, the former
Communist mayor of Mexico City and a virulent anti-American, would win, and
no doubt Mexico under that scenario might withdraw from the North American
Free Trade Agreement. But in any event, it would usher in—I suspect there is a
lot of prospect here that I would say from the point of view of United StatesMexican relations, you know, the lesser problem might turn out to be NAFTA
and trade, and the bigger problem will be border security and a total lack of
cooperation and migration from Central America and drug controls and other
things. So I just put that out there because there are a lot of uncertainties as to
how this is going to unfold.
Let me say something now about the Canadian perception of this because—
and let me go back because we have heard a lot about American perceptions of
Mr. Trump—clearly thinks this is all unfair and unbalanced and so on, so,
Canadian perceptions. When we started negotiating the Free Trade Agreement
with the United States, there were very serious concerns in Canada, a large
segment of the population, that this was really a crazy idea; that here we were
sitting down to negotiate Free Trade Agreement with a country that was much
larger, much more powerful, and a lot of Canadians were convinced that we were
going to lose our shirt and worse. And indeed, when we concluded that
agreement, the Canadian election of 1988 was fought essentially on the one issue
of the Free Trade Agreement. And there was a point in that election where the
polling showed that the Government was going to lose the election. Well, in the
end, they didn’t, but it was a very close-run thing. And then in the NAFTA, you
know, when we were negotiating the NAFTA, a lot of the same concerns came
back. You know, what are we doing? We are exposed again, and I think it was
something like 75 percent of the Canadians thought it was a bad idea for us to be
negotiating the NAFTA. You know, the polling has now changed around
considerably because we Canadians have realized, well, the bad things that
people said were going to happen didn’t happen, and actually, you know, while
we have a balanced—I would say a balanced trade relationship with the United
States, it is one in which Canadians are doing well. It has had a beneficial effect,
and the Canadians acknowledge that pretty broadly.
However, we got into—and I was struck—let me come back to what Jim
Blanchard said earlier when he was talking about the people he talked to, about
the sort of relief with Mike Pence as vice president, and I don’t want to quote too
selectively, but he mentioned two of the things that he is in favor of, were the
rule of law and the Constitution. You know, if anybody had told me when we
finished negotiating the NAFTA that, you know, twenty years later or twenty
five years later I would be sitting at a conference and people would be saying
that it is a good thing that the vice president of the United States believes in the
rule of law and the Constitution, I would have thought, you know, this is an
impossible scenario if you can imagine. (Laughter.)
So you know, but yet, we believe—in Canada we believe in the rule of law.
We think it is important, and we like it domestically, and we also like it
internationally because when we negotiate an agreement, we want to know
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where we stand. We don’t want a deal where we have to renegotiate it every four
or five years because it is starting to look unbalanced from the other side. You
know, we don’t want to create rules that are changed every time the United
States is doing better than or doing worse than we are.
And let me here, too, say, because there is a lot of discussion about trade
balances, and you can argue whether they are really relevant or not in
consideration of trade policy, but let me just point out that if you look at the
Canadian trade balance with the United States, we do run traditionally, but not
every year, a trade surplus in goods. But if you take out raw materials and energy
products in particular, then the United States has a very large surplus in
manufactured goods with Canada, manufactured goods. They also have a very
large surplus in services.
So you know, I think when Canada—so the government is going to have
difficulty potentially depending on the kind of negotiation we get into managing
a situation in which the Canadians see that we are really under fire and attack,
and, you know, I think the government will negotiate in good faith and be
prepared to do a number of things. There are constructive things we can do in
terms of borrowing things from TPP, but when we get down to some of those
hard-core issues that are obvious, we can find them in the national trade
estimates, they are there every year. They are now in the letter, and I think there
will be some issues on which the Canadian government will probably say no, we
are not going to do that. You know, we have done this, this and this and this, and
we have asked you to do this and this and this, and you have said you will do
that, but you said no, no, no, no, no to all these other things. You know, we will
want to negotiate in a way that makes it clear that we have engaged in a good
faith effort to produce something, but there could very well be a point in which
we will say enough is enough.
You know, that’s it. You have to go away and decide, draw your own
conclusions about what you are going to do as a result of that situation. And so
you know, I put that out there. Let me say, too, finally, just on a couple of
specifics because I am not going to try to get into talking about all the issues in
the negotiation, but let’s talk about dairy, and let me talk about Buy America just
to pick two.
MR. WOLFF: Easy ones.
MR. WEEKES: And government procurement more broadly. Sorry, sir,
what?
MR. WOLFF: The easy ones.
MR. WEEKES: A couple of easy ones. So dairy. You know, as somebody
who is sort of watching what’s going on in this area in Canada, I think actually
that we could be getting to the point in the not too distant future where the
pressure is for reform, and you see it already with some of the changes in pricing,
are becoming so big, the system has become so sclerotic it just doesn’t; that, you
know, there are going to be domestic pressures as well as international pressures
to make some changes. But it is the sort of thing you can’t do quickly overnight
because you need to work it out and plan it properly, and there would have to be
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transition and so on. And let me clarify, I am not speaking for the government,
but you know, when you look, one of the things we would be interested in here,
though, I am sure, if we get to that stage is, we would want an even playing field
and reciprocity. It has got to be fair.
And if you look at U.S. dairy policy, it is not exactly an open market scheme
either. In fact, you know, you could go—so are we talking here about a reform of
Canadian dairy policy or a reform of American dairy policy, North American
dairy policy? You know, what would be on the table in this situation? If the
United States were prepared to say, okay, we will have a fundamental look at
how our dairy policy is structured as well and put that on the table, then maybe
we could have a different kind of discussion. I am not sure that’s in prospect.
Now, on Buy America, it is very—let me say a couple of things: One is, I
notice in looking at the draft letter that it talks about both, Buy America in the
United States, and it talks about trying to get better access to foreign
procurement markets in the NAFTA partners. So you know, we have been open
for some time to the idea of enlarging our government procurement agreement
within NAFTA with the United States. We are ready to do that, I think, and we
have done it with the European Union. So you know, later this year we will be
giving for the first time major preferences at the provincial level to European
suppliers for surface transportation systems, hydroelectric—electrical generating
facilities and so on. And I think it is going to be interesting, you know, the first
time that some big European company wins a $600 million-dollar contract for
one of these things in Canada, and their American competitor finds out that they
weren’t allowed to compete.
So one of the big objectives we have had traditionally in trade negotiations,
and I think we have it again now is, we want—we want to get better controls on
Buy America in the United States, and we are prepared to pay for that. But from
some of what I listened to, it doesn’t sound like that’s necessarily Mr. Trump’s
idea of how we will do things, but maybe I am wrong.
I will stop there because I thought I better, you know, the amount of time we
have is rather limited. We can’t get into everything, but I thought I would give a
flavor, big picture, a sense of perception of Canadians, and then look at some of
the problems with trying to think about how you negotiate on a couple of issues
that, as Alan said, are a couple of the more difficult ones.
MR. SANDS: Alan, can I ask—yeah, bring your microphone down.
MR. WOLFF: Thank you very much; pleasure to be here. The fact is that
history tends to—I don’t know if it repeats itself and said to Ron—I started out in
the U.S. Treasury, and what we were worried about is our trade deficit in a sense.
It was really we had a surplus, but we were defending the whole world. We were
giving a lot of foreign aid, still giving a lot of foreign aid, and our surplus was
not large enough to cover our obligations, and the French, always helpful, were
flying plane loads of gold out of Fort Knox every night, which was a matter of
concern because our reserves of gold backing the U.S. dollar at the time, which
was fixed, the exchange rate was fixed, $35 an ounce, that we were going to be
in real trouble.
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So along came an import surcharge, 10 percent against all imports, which I
drafted at the time at Treasury, always a free trader at trading, and we put into
effect a tax provision. The domestic international sales corporation helped us on
exports. I went over to Geneva the year before. It was an act to explain to then
GATT, predecessor of WTO, why it was legitimate, and sold no one. We put it
into effect, and we were condemned by the GATT and removed it.
Bob Lighthizer, who was the USTR designate during his time in office at
USTR, defended the next trade element of tax policy, went over to Geneva and,
of course, lost, and we are back to that again where we are trying to figure things
out. But we put on the import surcharge, and then we said foreign markets are
unfairly closed. There is a lack of reciprocity.
So we had three delegations to negotiate: One with Japan, one with Europe,
and one with Canada. I was on the Canada team, and for some reason nobody
wanted to give us unilateral concessions. We didn’t understand it. It was
evolving, but we just got no place so there was a decision to have a multilateral
round of trade negotiations called the Tokyo Round, and that did work. I was
invited to be on this panel according to the esteemed Mr. Cunningham, and I
wouldn’t use the term he used, but because I was somewhat bipolar in trade, I
first came to Cleveland representing Republic Steel. Later I represented LTV
Steel. I, along with Lighthizer and a group of six major steel companies that we
represented against dumping and subsidization and injurious, otherwise injurious
imports and for a little while Wilbur Ross’ company because he wasn’t in the
steel business all that long, but I worked with him on that.
But I chaired the National Foreign Council, which is the oldest free trade
organization in the United States. And it doesn’t go back quite as far as to the
Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada. President Taft, native son
here, wanted to have open trade, wanted to reduce tariffs. Congress wouldn’t
give him that. The conservative Republicans were against that at the time, and
they said, but we will let you have free trade with Canada. So the U.S. and
Canada negotiated a Free Trade Agreement under Taft and Laurier. Laurier went
home and his government failed. Canada just couldn’t live up to its obligations
under that agreement. It was politically unpopular.
MR. WEEKES: Very unfair.
MR. WOLFF: Very unfair. You labor under an interesting disadvantage in
that you have to get up early in the morning and read what’s happened overnight
in the White House to describe what’s going on. Trade policy—and Terry was
talking about today’s executive orders coming out in this area—what I want to
do, go one step back for a moment in Canadian waters anyway. Our current trade
policy dated back to when Cordell Hull was around. You could also date it back
to Placentia Bay in August of 1942 when Churchill and Roosevelt got together.
MR. HERMAN: ‘41.
MR. WOLFF: ‘42.
MR. HERMAN: ‘41. Before Pearl Harbor.
MR. WOLFF: I wasn’t there. (Laughter.)
MR. WEEKES: Larry was.
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MR. WOLFF: ‘41. You are right. Okay.
MR. WEEKES: We will go on, but somebody Google it quickly.
MR. WOLFF: ‘41. Okay. The Atlantic Charter had two provisions in it that
dealt with economics, and what it basically said is all countries should have the
ability to trade openly with each other, and it sort of—the vision of maybe a little
bit more Roosevelt than Churchill. Churchill was always a free trader, but he did
like, I think, imperial preferences. But the idea of multilateralism may have been
born there and came into fruition with GATT, which is relevant to where we are
today.
Terry has outlined a number of things that this administration has said about
trade. Economic nationalism, national sovereignty, Buy American, hire
American, all prior trade agreements are terrible. NAFTA is the worst trade deal
maybe ever signed anywhere but certainly ever signed in this country. That’s
Donald Trump in September.
So Steven Nugen coming back from the G20 Summit, finance minister, said
as long as we can renegotiate trade deals that are good for us, we won’t be
protectionists. Otherwise, we will.
So let’s look at those, you know, hands across the sea, trying to have—
bilateral agreements are the way to go, and as Terry said, bilateral trade deficits
balance a measure of success or failure. On the subject of WTO, Terry may have
noted a number of positive statements with respect to WTO, and maybe John did,
but I haven’t found them. Public sentiment to the United States, which this
Administration says, first of all, whoever wins gets to determine what their
mandate is. You could win by a very small margin if you are George W. Bush or
if you are Donald Trump and you have a mandate because you have a mandate.
It turns out that 72 percent in 2017, Gallup survey says exports are more of an
opportunity than imports are a threat, and 73 percent of the 18 to 29 age group
say that NAFTA has been good for the United States. The fellow who does this
represents Pew Research says, Bruce Stokes says all that has to happen is for this
generation to die off, and we will have potentially free trade outlook in the
United States. Young people were a major part of the Bernie Sanders
phenomenon, but they are free traders. Sort of interesting.
So where do we go from here? March 1 the President’s trade agenda for
2017, trade policy agenda came out, and while the tone is about economic
sovereignty and economic nationalism, in fact, the reality of the bullet points of
what they want to do are really in a traditional sense centers on policy. Terry
mentioned that, as did John, that the Constitution is still in force in large parts.
The commerce power is still in the Congress, and the Administration has
discovered the existence of the Congress, including on healthcare. The statutes
are still in place. We do have the rule of law, and therefore, a notice is going up
to the Hill, which we see in draft because everything is leaked that gives the
negotiating objectives as they want them to be sent out. There was no change in
the Congress in the United States to speak of. Orrin Hatch is still chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee, and Ron Wyden is still the ranking Democrat, and if
you look at the hearing confirmation hearing for the U.S. Trade Representative,
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which was a love-in of sorts, Bob Lighthizer had been staff director 30 years or
so ago of the committee supported by Republicans and Democrats alike.
Another sort of future of the landscape is the bureaucracy is still there, and in
fact, that’s all that is there because in most departments of the U.S. Government,
there is just a secretary, the top of the department, and maybe a political
appointee of sorts but not confirmed by the Senate. So there is a lot that is going
to be pretty standard. Now, you know, John described the promiscuity of the
Canadian government with respect to free trade agreements. The question is, we
want bilaterals now, just bilaterals, which we don’t know whether NAFTA is a
bilateral or trilateral, and that is yet to be discovered, but NAFTA is the first—
where else do we turn?
We will date, sort of speed dating with the UK. They can’t do anything with
respect to—they are still members of the European Union, not in good standing,
so we will have some discussions with them. The Japanese really, really, really
would prefer that we don’t come across the Pacific and talk to them because they
are afraid we will say, well, a little more rice, a little more beef, a little more this
and that, and they like TPP as did I; spent a lot of time on it. And then, the list
gets pretty thin in terms of who you have to deal with. There were talks with
Vietnam that were not for Free Trade Agreement at this point but sort of, why
don’t you live up to TPP, and we will see what we can do later kind of
discussion.
So then, we come to NAFTA and what should be in it. And I had a whole
series of things I would have said about what I thought would be in it, but then
along came—because we had to wake up in the morning, and two days ago we
didn’t know what would be in it in terms of the U.S. objectives, but now to a
substantial degree we do. And it is an interesting letter. It is an eight-page letter
available online, and the first paragraph was sort of interesting because they
acted, the U.S. Trade Representative Steven Vaughn notes that he has the
authority delegated by him to notify the Congress under the Trade Act, the past
trade promotion authority to give this notice. And so it is not a letter from Wilbur
Ross who was Secretary of Commerce, who was designated to lead this thing. It
is from USTR, and the finance committee is quite intent upon USTR leading, and
it has in it I found interesting things compared with the rhetoric making an
objective, making it more profitable to manufacture within the trading block.
That’s North American integration. That’s sort of an interesting thing to say
given the fact that it was, you know, that’s not exactly ‘America First’ language.
Then it talks about a trade deficit with Canada and Mexico lumped in
together, which is interesting because Canada, I think, would like to think of
itself as having a deficit with us rather than—or at least in balance, but take out
the oil and raw materials that U.S. has a surplus. It recognizes global value
chains. That’s sort of interesting because actually that’s not where this
administration has, I think, where its head has been in terms of what the rollback
is. Mr. Trump is saying don’t have your plant to Mexico and to several others.
That’s very interesting. Seek to level the playing field on tax treatment. Now,
that could be about Mexico’s bat. It could be about the U.S. border adjustability,
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sort of insulating the United States in a NAFTA agreement that we could put on
a border of vegetables, of a measure in our tax system. And then you get to some
other things like rules of origin, support production for jobs in the United States.
Not the block.
Now, maybe I am reading too much into this, but we slip back into America
First. This antidumping and Canada enforcement, I assume Terry wrote that, and
it is sensible stuff, protection of intellectual property, cross-border data flows,
could be open to fixing something that was wrong in TPP in terms of financial
services.
Now, when we get to government procurement a defensive trench is dug in
that it says that seek to establish rules that require government procurement to be
conducted in a manner that is consistent with U.S. law and the Administration’s
policy on domestic procurement preferences. That would seem to say Canada
don’t bother. We are going to keep our Buy America. There are elements of TPP
that come in anticorruption, competition policy, state-owned enterprises. There
are safeguard mechanisms, not too exciting. It is a snapback to existing law, and
there are things on labor and the environment that actually NGOs should like.
So—oh, get rid of Chapter 19, which is the appellate process instead of U.S.
courts for antidumping and countervailing, and one of the interesting things is
Lindsey Graham, who is still around, was one of seven senators who wrote an
amicus brief that said Chapter 19 was unconstitutional.
So that’s bound to come back. The right to regulate is in here, which is
another NGO sort of thing that the protection of health, safety, and environment,
essential security and consumer interest will be safe guarded. It is not
revolutionary. It is very interesting. What isn’t here? When Lighthizer was
before—the USGO designate was before the Senate Finance Committee, they
actually didn’t talk about these things. What they talked about was dairy. Seven
senators said Canadian dairy. By the way, all the complaints I think were all
Canada, not about Mexico.
MR. WEEKES: Yes. This is the difference between the grand rhetoric and
the nitty-gritty that the trade negotiations are actually about.
MR. WOLFF: Right. So open dairy, and by the way, I don’t think that
Canada really would like a totally open market. Trudeau seems to have some
base in Quebec and Ontario and probably would like to remain Prime Minister
for a bit, and they wouldn’t fit. We wouldn’t have a totally open market, and
Canada certainly wouldn’t, so I don’t think we are headed there.
And they said Senator Hatch, the chairman, said—and by the way, there is a
patent utility doctrine in Canada that really has to go. Canada would perhaps find
that difficult, some pharmaceuticals. Very largely this has been practiced. Well,
there are a series of things that were mentioned. Lighthizer can’t come back,
USTR can’t come back from the negotiations and say, by the way, we did none
of the things that you asked; didn’t touch a single one of them. We modernized
the agreement, but we didn’t get into it.
So lastly, the question of timing, which John has touched upon, before this
letter came out there was the illusion that there were two choices. One is what we
shall call technically a quickie, just modernize it, get a bunch of stuff out of TPP,
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throw it in, four months we are done. Mexico very much wants this. It is the
position of Mexico. Canada would really like that, but along comes an eight-page
letter, which doesn’t look like a quickie and doesn’t include the things that we
are actually going to ask for or that Canada is going to ask for. Canada would
like Buy America to be waived pretty much with respect to Canada. We are
supposed to have a trillion-dollar infrastructure bill. They’d really, really like to
participate fully in that infrastructure build out. Canada would like freer
movement of people across the border for services. Congress seems to think they
have the role, the lead role on immigration, which they don’t exercise, but they
would like to hold on to it. So the things that Canada wants were very unlikely to
find easy. The things that we want, Canada will find it very difficult.
And then, you get, just really lastly, what do we do with the WTO I
mentioned? Who is going to lead? We have Xi Jinping coming out as the Davos
man, and the track record has not be grand with respect to China leading, I think
for a variety of reasons. They have their own domestic problems. Going to
Geneva and China, saying we want totally open trade actually probably will not
sell very well with 163 other members. So they are not really able to lead; just
Canada, Australia, Lee Kuan Yew of his generation, you know, who gets up
there and says the U.S. is sitting back, and who is going to go for the multilateral
trading system?
MR. WEEKES: Angela.
MR. WOLFF: Who?
MR. WEEKES: Angela.
MR. WOLFF: Ah, yes. Well, she has some issues, too, and does Mr. Trump
fall under Merkel? Not very willingly. And the EU, actually they have some
internal issues of their own right now. So things don’t look all that good for the
ministerial in December. They never do. But I think it is a little bit worse off
right now.
I will stop there. Thank you.
MR. SANDS: That was a very good panel so far, but one of the great things
about the Canada-U.S. Law Institute is that we have a very learned and sharp
audience with some outstanding up and comers amongst the students, so we will
take what was a great start and make it great again by getting all of you again
involved in conversation.
So I am going to turn to you for questions, and I will keep looking for you
and just flag it. I see Larry Herman is quick off the mark.
MR. HERMAN: First of all, I want to thank the panel. I thought that was
absolutely fantastic, very high level, and I might say it is the sort of thing that
CUSLI does very well. We are all grateful for the thoughtfulness of each of you.
MR. ROBINSON: Here, here.
MR. HERMAN: When we look at the eight-page letter, whether it is
tweaked or not in final form, I think it is probably something we can take as
setting out the U.S. negotiating agenda. I have a couple questions. First of all,
everything is on the table when it comes to NAFTA renegotiation. I think that’s
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quite clear. You can parse this any way you want, but basically, it is saying
everything is on the table.
So my question, sir, one narrow one and one a broader one, the first question
is, wouldn’t it be in Canada’s interest to put something like this out from the
Canadian perspective? I think that there is a loss of leverage if you wait for the
other guy to come back with specifics. So the question is, from a negotiating
dynamic, shouldn’t Canada say what Canada wants? And by the way, going back
to the FTA, Canada paid for that binational panel system, Chapter 19. We paid
for it, by and large, by giving you guys free trade and energy products. Maybe
Canada should say something about what it is prepared to put on the table.
But my broader question is, this is for each of you: This is an aggressive
negotiating agenda. We have seen statements from the President during the
campaign and in his inaugural address, and so my question is this: How much
tension can the system take in terms of Canada-US relations? What do you think
this is going to lead to in the process before the system, if I can put it that way,
breaks down in broad political and diplomatic terms?
MR. SANDS: Who would like to jump in on that?
MR. WEEKES: Well, all right. I will start because part of it is about the
Canadian list, and I think it would be interesting, too, to hear the other panelists
here about what they think the effect of a Canadian list would be in the United
States, because I think that’s one of the considerations that the Canadian
government should have in mind when they are thinking whether to prepare such
a list. The other problem is the one that is the difference in my experience
between sort of how Americans go about making policy for a trade negotiation,
how Canadians do, and Americans are much more forthright about figuring out
how they are going to get those damn foreigners. And so, you know, they fashion
proposals to get the foreigners that don’t really think in the first instance about,
oh, you mean we are going to have to agree to that, too? And so I have seen a
number of times where Americans don’t have any–it doesn’t bother them really
at all to sort of get part way through a negotiation and say “oh, by the way, we
are withdrawing that proposal,” or “we are amending it to read as follows.”
With Canadians, the first thing Canadian ministers want to know when
officials come forward with a proposal for a negotiating mandate is, what we are
going to ask for that; what are they going to ask in return? Or do we really want
to suggest that we are actually willing to get into that discussion like about dairy,
for instance, would be put on a list that we want, you know, what we would like
to see in terms of reform of the U.S. dairy sector or, at least, that that part of what
we would want the negotiation to be about, because that would really make it
clear that we were prepared to negotiate in that space. Now, I would say I think
that the political consequence of doing something on dairy is greatly
overestimated in a lot of political circles in Canada. Martha Hall Findlay was a
Member of Parliament and actually ran for the leadership of the Liberal Party of
Canada, did a very interesting study on what would be the political consequences
of reforming, substantially reforming dairy policy? And her conclusion was,
there was only one constituency in the country in which that might be the
determining factor in the election.
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So you know, I suspect the Canadian government could look at how to
reform dairy policy. Maybe they would rather not have to get into that, but a lot
of it might be in terms of how it was presented, but it certainly couldn’t be
reformed without reform on the American side of the border as well. How much
tension can the system take? That’s a very good question, and I don’t think the
Canadian government would like to answer that question. Maybe they will have
to think about that internally because we are going to . . .
MR. HERMAN: It is a question for the American side.
MR. WEEKES: Sorry?
MR. HERMAN: It is a question for the American side. In other words, our
friends need it or not?
MR. WEEKES: Well, all right. I won’t attempt to answer it any further.
MR. WOLFF: Well, we used to be friends with Australia. (Laughter.)
So there is a little bit of respectability in the system. I would say there is
going to be a line at the door when the government says, well, we are going to
negotiate, and they are going to have some public process, and everyone will
come in who has an axe to grind, and they are going to come in. Today—and I
don’t have it yet, maybe Terry knows—but the national trade estimate is coming
out from USTR. That’s going to be part of our negotiating list, the Canada
chapter of it, which is every complaint that we have with respect to every other
country listed. The Mexicans are already in the public process, so I think that,
you know, there will be something of a Canadian list. The free trade and energy,
Chapter 19, I thought Canada wanted to export a few things through a Keystone
pipeline. Otherwise, what was all that about?
In terms of tension, besides unpredictability, there is a very, very strong
constituency for Canada in the U.S. Congress. Generally speaking in the
bureaucracy and the American people as a whole, Canada is not considered a
country with which we ought to have serious problems. So reality creeps in.
One of the things that is going to shape the negotiation is reality. All of
American business with very few exceptions, if there are any, want to have good
relations with Canada. The Canadian Embassy has screamed in Washington on
the wall that talks about the amount of trade that goes across one bridge, Windsor
and Detroit is equal to whatever. A couple of weeks of trade in one day, it is the
same as a month or two of trade with Japan. There is a strong constituency for
maintaining that relationship, and I don’t think a tweet is going to destroy that,
and I certainly don’t think this negotiation—this is a very interesting document
that came out, the eight pages. It is not an attack on Canada. It is not even an
attack on Mexico.
So you know, I think that there will be traditional negotiation, and we will
come out of it still with some shreds of our friendship intact across the board.
MR. STEWART: Let me just add, I have a couple thoughts: I agree that the
while the list may be a starting point, I think, in fact, it will be fairly significantly
modified, both for the reasons that Alan reviewed— that none of the issues or a
few of the issues that were actually raised by the Senate Finance Committee and
the confirmation hearing for Bob Lighthizer are picked up. And you already had
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a significant opposition come after the Democrats for what hasn’t been included
in the list, so I think that you will see a compilation of other things that go
through.
At the end of the day, at the moment, U.S. agriculture is in a four-year slump
because U.S. agriculture is, some would say, overrepresented but certainly
prominently represented in the Senate Finance Committee, and there is keen
interest in seeing that markets are open, further open for agriculture. And that
will be a key break, I think, in terms of how aggressive the U.S. is in terms of
pushing past the tension points simply because the U.S. does not want to find
itself in a situation where significant market access is lost because people start to
pull out of agreements, and I would say one of the issues that isn’t on the list but
I would expect to be there by the time the list is finished is geographical
indications and the wonderful deal that you all have cut with the Europeans.
MR. SANDS: Governor Blanchard?
GOVERNOR-AMBASSADOR BLANCHARD: This has really been really
helpful.
Terry, you mentioned about the popular attitude on trade. I think it is
important for our audience to recall that even in 2008 Hillary [Clinton] called for
renegotiating NAFTA in a debate with Barack Obama in Ohio, and he finally
consented to that as well. All the candidates came out against TPP. I did notice in
the rallies in Michigan that Bernie Sanders, who carried Michigan as well, the
rallies were all mostly young people all having driven to the rallies, the cars
imported from Japan. So the young people were not exactly there because of
trade; they were there because he was giving a finger to the system, big banks to
Wall Street, to whatever, the corrupt politicians that he claimed had ruined our
country.
What I want to mention was, I think the Buy America provisions are really
much more significant. There was a Buy America provision in the stimulus bill,
and it got there—the big lobbyist for it was Leo Gerard, the Canadian, steel. He
didn’t think—I guess he didn’t think it was going to apply to Canadian steel.
Well, it turned out it did, even though we had a procurement agreement. The
procurement didn’t include subnational entities because at the time Canada
didn’t want to ask its provinces to assent to the agreement. So I don’t know
how—when I talked to Sander Levin, he didn’t think it was going to apply to
Canada. Well, it did. Now, it got finessed, but I think that’s a big one, and I don’t
know whether there is going to be a way to exempt Canada from Buy America or
not. Ambassador Heyman mentioned that Governor Cuomo has already got Buy
New York, and that has already triggered friction with the Premier of Ontario.
So these are all things swimming around, but I think it is going to be a huge
issue, maybe bigger than dairy and some of the others, I really do. My question
though—that was my speech; now my question. (Laughter.)
You guys have enormous experience at this. Who are the people that you
feel have the best kind of judgment and knowledge in Congress or any
administration? I understand Lighthizer is a very talented guy and will do a good
mainstream job is what I hear, but who are the people, Alan, over the years or
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Terry, at least, in the U.S. that you trust to handle these things wisely and with
some depth in terms of politics?
MR. WOLFF: Well, you know, Ways and Means and Finance leadership are
really pretty solid, and the occasional issue with Ron Wyden, he might care a
little bit about lumber, but you know, generally speaking, there is a center of
gravity in the two committees that is, I think, very helpful. Paul Ryan is not at
odds where Ken Brady is. An issue will come up over the border of adjustability
if that comes through the House, and that’s going to be a big issue for Canada,
super big issue I would think, maybe more than government procurement but at
least a rival.
MR. WEEKES: Certainly more than government procurement actually.
MR. WOLFF: Yeah. But as we know.
MR. WEEKES: I was going to say it might be bigger than NAFTA, probably
is.
MR. WOLFF: It is going to be interesting. My proposal for that is if U.S. did
it, that there be—if we adopt border adjustability, what we would have is an
international conference of finance ministers and trade ministers with tax folks
and with economic experts and work through how our various tax structures
affect each other. But putting that aside, government procurement, I think you
are quite right is going to be a major issue, and yeah, what does Canada want to
ask of the United States? That is I would think going to be number one. First of
all, you have to have been in the steel business to be in this administration.
Wilbur Ross was. Lighthizer was.
MR. WEEKES: Or in the military.
MR. WOLFF: The two deputies. Well, there is another thing: You know, the
number one—the number one competitor in all of this is China, which has been
going silent. We will see what comes out of the Xi Jinping meeting, if anything.
Trump has already said it is going to be a very difficult meeting, and we will see
how that is managed. I would think the generals care a lot about whether nuclear
missiles come in our direction. And it is difficult to have a very contentious trade
relationship and solve really the major problems we have, and on top of that, I do
wish Chrystia Freeland luck with an agreement with China. There is nothing like
a Free Trade Agreement with China to do wonders for your economy, especially
if they are having a lot of natural resources dug out of the ground by Chinese and
shipped back home. It is . . .
MR. WEEKES: Are you lecturing us?
MR. WOLFF: Yes. (Laughter.)
MR. STEWART: Let me just add to Alan’s comment. I think that there is a
tension between the Congress and the Administration in terms of trade that has
largely been kept below the surface at this point. For exactly the reason that Alan
went through, you have, I think, a very traditional view of trade policy in both of
the core committees, which will drive most of the process, and there has been
pushback on a range of issues that the Administration, at least, talked about, the
press talked about during the campaign in terms of unilateral tariffs, and those
sorts of things.
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That being said, because we are still at the stage where the Congress is trying
to work with the Administration, I do think that they will perhaps accept some of
the issues that are important to the Administration and the trade policy
modification arena than they would have, and of course, it has been the Congress
and not the Administration that has teed up on border adjustability, which is
really an issue, as Alan reviewed in his opening statements, but out there for the
U.S. for 50 years, direct and indirect taxes we foolishly accepted back in the ‘50s
as part of the gap, and there was a very interesting piece in the New York Times
on March 7th that Keith Archer put out, that kind of took a look . . .
MR. WEEKES: Somebody got to him. That was my conclusion when I read
that.
MR. STEWART: Well, all you have to do is look at the two charts he has.
The first chart takes a look at the average tariffs, and the second chart takes a
look at the combination of tariffs and indirect taxes that countries have, and we
are—the problem that the U.S. identified back in the ‘60s when we tried to start
working with our trading partners to get the issue resolved is in bold relief in
terms of those two charts. So we either can find a bilateral approach that deals
with some of the discrimination or distortions because we have been unwilling or
unable to adopt a value added tax system ourselves. All right. Or we will end up
with these kind of half steps like the border adjustability that is out there, which
tries to do much of that.
But the only reason that it is in the Republican bill is, it pays for a significant
part of the tax relief so that you are not driving even larger budget deficits for the
United States.
MR. SANDS: Stephen Petras.
MR. PETRAS: Thanks again to the panel. Outstanding. This question will be
directed first to Terry, and then the rest of the panel can chime in, but it seems
that Trump’s approach is, at least to get elected, was focused on jobs, creating
jobs, big jobs. And he blamed trade agreements, and then the reality is like
Governor Blanchard mentioned, that’s one thing maybe, but it is not the biggest.
You have to know, there is technology, there is automation, there is all these
other pressures on jobs. In the analysis that is being done is the Trump
Administration, and it may be behind closed doors looking at that issue, looking
at what is technology going to do to employment as we go forward, and what are
the ways to deal with that?
MR. STEWART: Well, I guess my own view is that we have so many gaps
still existing in the personnel that I am sure it is an issue that is of concern within
the Administration, but I don’t know that it is receiving a high priority at this
point in time. I think most of the people who have complained about trade and
job loss, the argument that technology is the main driver of reduction of jobs has
never been an issue that has been contested by folks who are concerned who we
are, the only nation on the face of the earth that runs a three quarter of a trillion
dollar a year trade deficit in goods, the only nation. It is not due to development
because Germany runs a large surplus. Japan fluctuates between surplus and
small deficit, and so the fact that neither party has been knowing, to try to figure
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out why it is we had shifted into such a large trade deficit structure over the last
40 years is really, in my view, what drives the concern.
The fact that the Administration puts out a figure here is how many jobs we
get from a billion dollars of exports, but you can never find a figure that says
here is how many jobs we lose from a billion dollars of imports; only adds to the
concern that the people inside the Beltway care about their policy and don’t care
about what the effect is on lives of people out in the business community and the
smoke stack industries or high tech industries or agriculture who are not seeing
the benefit. So sure, technology is an issue.
There are some automation issues that are out there, that will affect a lot of
people going forward, but those are not—you know, the steel industry doesn’t
complain because they went from having tens of thousands of people at plants to
a few hundred or a thousand people at a plant. That was all part of the
modernization that they have done. They are concerned when we run a large
trade deficit in steel or the steel that comes in seriously undermines the prices of
domestic steel and puts the companies on the ropes and results in large layoffs.
And those are the issues, I think, the Trump Administration cares about because
those are the issues they heard at the town meetings when they were in Ohio or
Michigan or Wisconsin or Pennsylvania or North Carolina where people were
saying nobody listens to us.
The real reason in my view that NAFTA is viewed so negatively by so many
working people in America doesn’t have much to do with the trade deficit; it has
everything to do with the fact that virtually every company in the country uses
the ability to move jobs to Mexico or China as a justification for not increasing
wages or having very marginally increased the wages. I have been in businesses.
I have seen the negotiations, and I can tell you it is a constant beat-over-the-head.
“If you seek a pay increase that would keep you even with inflation or ahead of
inflation, we are going to move these jobs, whether it be to Mexico,” and Mexico
is usually used because it is a neighboring country, and it is obvious or China,
which is another example. That is kind of the gray elephant in the room that
never gets talked about in terms of why there is so much angst about NAFTA.
MR. WEEKES: Well, you can go first. Then I really will be able to attack
both of you.
MR. WOLFF: Okay. The trade policy agenda, the March 1 trade policy
agenda of the President of the United States for 2017 ends on the following: It
says “we are going to have domestic measures in terms of lower taxes, less
regulation and spending on infrastructure,” and then it says “and we will
negotiate better trade agreements.” It is a trade document that talks about
economic or broader issues.
Now, how does that play through in the budget? Not so much because there
is nothing on worker training except cuts. There is basically [research and
development (“R & D”)] is cut, which I think is really terrible. What hasn’t come
up by the way in all of this is a little more on steel.
By the way, being in this Administration, you either work for Goldman
Sachs, or you litigate steel. It is binary, the only two choices that are going to be
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involved in trade, so I think with China you probably say maybe voluntary
export restraints come back because capacity reduction isn’t going to do it.
Whether Xi Jinping can sacrifice jobs to do that is a question, and we didn’t
touch upon it, I don’t think, is currency. It is not in the letter, and . . .
MR. STEWART: Raised by the Democrats.
MR. WOLFF: And it has been raised as something missing. My own view is
that the fact that constant manipulation, which is called for, you should not defeat
trade concessions through manipulation of currency, is in the GATT, it is in the
IMF Articles of Agreement, and that will come back, I think. And that will be an
added element.
But it is not that the Administration has totally ignored the subject, but there
are other things going on, but they are not headed, I think, in the right direction
with respect to—other than the tax side of things in terms of growing the
corporate rate and potentially some less regulation. They are not tending to those
issues in the same way, but it is not forgotten. Those elements are out there.
John?
MR. WEEKES: Very good comments, both of you. I think one of the
problems here is that, although manufacturing output in the United States is
going up, and as I think larger now than it ever has been, employment in
manufacturing has obviously been going down, and I think to some extent we are
witnessing—and this is true in probably all three NAFTA countries—we are
witnessing something that was—what happened a century ago in terms of
agriculture. I mean, in 1800, what percent of the American population was
employed in agriculture? And now whatever it was then, I am sure it was
probably around 80 percent of people who were employed. Now it is down under
two percent, I believe, and yet, agricultural production is much higher.
So I come back to this because this is really about technology and what’s
happening in technology, and I think that probably in Canada but certainly in the
United States, I think the political leadership has been somewhat dishonest in not
coming out with the public and saying the reason, you know, these people are
sitting at home, that lies behind the malaise described in Hillbilly Elegy is caused
by the major disrupter being technological change and innovation.
But it is pretty hard to say what if you are a political leader and you
acknowledge this is the problem, so what do you do about it? So we are going to
ban the internet, smash everybody’s computer, and tell them it is illegal to have a
Smartphone. This is how we could fix this because then there would be a lot
more people employed. No, it is much easier to blame foreigners and foreign
goods, foreign workers and come at it that way, and there has been almost no
political constituency in the United States for people who would stand up in an
election campaign and say, well, actually, that’s not the way it is. It is, you know,
the tendency has been to get on the bandwagon, whether you are Hillary Clinton
or Barack Obama and blame foreigners and say that the trade agreement is bad,
and I will fix it when I am elected.
And I think that, you know, the ultimate bankruptcy of that is now evident as
a policy approach, and I think—another problem in this in terms of trade related
adjustment assistance, the whole concept of that kind of suggests to the common
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person that it is trade that is causing the dislocation that requires adjustment
assistance. I mean, in Canada our policies aren’t perfect, but we have tried to
design policies that deal with the problem of dislocation of the work force rather
than ascribing it to a particular cost and then looking at what you do to address
that.
So I think you touched on something that is very important and that has
become central in the trade debate but isn’t really be part of the trade debate.
MR. SANDS: Question over here.
MR. LOWE: Thanks. Bruce Lowe from Taft [Stettinius & Hollister LLP].
One thing that—one element that perhaps has been completely overlooked in this
equation is something that I was reminded of when I was listening to a National
Public Radio program a few weeks ago, and they were interviewing a chap from
Rexnord, which is a big Indianapolis based outfit. And they were interviewing a
chap who had just been laid off after about 25 or 30 years, an assembly line
manufacturing type job, and he was being laid off because his job had been
moved or was going to be moved to Mexico. I don’t know where they were
building the new plant. He said, well, it is not my preference, but I am sort of
near the end of my time, working career, and at least, I have got something put
away so I am not in terribly bad shape, and most important of all, both of my two
kids have just gotten through college. That reminded me of the fact that, you
know, we have been sending our [children] — for the past several generations,
we have been sending most of our children whenever we could to college in the
U.S. to do things, to learn, to get a degree, to supposedly do something other than
working on an assembly line or in a manufacturing job at the lower level.
The population, therefore, the working population it seems to me in
succeeding generations has significantly changed, and it is something that it
seems to me is very often overlooked by politicians. Hopefully, politicians on
both sides of the border in increasing numbers in the next few years will more
and more recognize this and deal not with lambasting free trade and trade deals
but find ways to find full employment for the changed labor force. Could you
comment on that, please? Thanks.
MR. SANDS: Gentlemen, what about that?
MR. WOLFF: Yeah, I would agree that that’s very much the case and a lot
of folks in academia working on the issue of worker training for the needs that
are coming forward, and just one element that came out earlier, trade adjustment
assistance being the wrong answer. Lots of folks understood that, that it
shouldn’t just be trade adjustment assistance. It is a matter of cost. George
Schultz said we should have unemployment insurance and other programs, and
we couldn’t afford it we thought, so we didn’t do it, and we still don’t do it.
I think that the community colleges, for example, and National Foreign
Trade Council started a new project with respect to worker training. A lot of
companies are very good at working with local institutions to come up with
worker training that suits their needs, so it is possible. If you look at upstate New
York, which was pretty much—had a little bit of wine of dubious quality you
could say, but it—I represented Kodak for a while. They went away, technology
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and a little bit of trade, too, to be sure there was dumping film, helped them go
under, but it was technology. But outside of Albany in Malta, a town probably no
one had heard of other than those who live there, the development authority had
a—not shuttle ready but permanent ready and infrastructure ready location for [a]
semiconductor fabrication facility. They put in some money, someone from Abu
Dhabi put in a lot of money, and it was because there are universities there and
colleges that formed a consortium to train workers that are needed for that sort of
activity.
If you look around the world where plants are located they are located where
there is the infrastructure that is needed for semiconductor production. If you
look around the world where R & D is taking place, it is where there is a pool of
engineering talent, and it turns out—and rule of law. So it is not so much in
China, but it is a lot in Eastern Europe and Israel, in the United States where IP
will be protected and where there is a pool of workers, engineers that can design
these chips.
I think business is getting pretty smart about locating where there is human
talent, and that’s one of the futures of our country, so your points are well taken.
MR. SANDS: Jump in. Terry?
MR. STEWART: I guess my only—my kind of macro point, I agree there
has been, obviously, a tremendous change in terms of the type of work that is
available, and the United States has done a great job over time of orchestrating so
that people can take advantage of where the opportunities are. But to simply say
that there are no issues because there is a smaller percentage of people that are
going into manufacturing than there used to be is to ignore the disparity of
income that has arisen and the stagnation of that has been going on for over 40
years in the United States, and that is the genesis of the movement of the Trump
Administration.
MR. SANDS: John, do you want to say one more word? Is this the same in
Canada?
MR. WEEKES: Well, I think so. I mean, I think this is a key point. You
know, the jobs that our grandchildren are going to be doing are going to be quite
different from the jobs our grandparents were doing, and this change is going to
continue, and it is going to accelerate. And so we need to be doing a better job of
identifying where are these requirements? You know, a university degree may be
a fine degree, but it is not necessarily going to put you in the marketplace of
tomorrow.
So we need to have a more hands-on approach to how we approach these
issues, plus I think the other problem is there needs to be some—I thought both
answers were good, and I like your description of what business is actually doing
and then looking at how businesses are locating near centers where they can have
the intellectual expertise they need to do the things that are now important. But
you don’t get much recognition of that in the public space. I mean, you have got
this populous backlash.
MR. LOWE: Well, that’s my point.
MR. WEEKES: I mean, of course, there is a problem there, and too many
politicians weren’t prepared to say I acknowledge your hurt. I mean, that’s what
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Trump did. He formed that link with those people and then sold them on the rest
of the message that I think wasn’t really quite an accurate diagnosis of what the
real problem was.
MR. SANDS: Speaking of acknowledging hurt, I have been very nice about
the lawyers. College degrees are still worthwhile says the professor to the
students. Don’t give up on that. John?
MR. WEEKES: It depends which degree.
MR. WOLFF: And just one on unemployment . . .
MR. WEEKES: By the way, this is going to be terrific for lawyers.
MR. WOLFF: Yes, that’s my point. That’s exactly it, if you want to go into
trade law, trade negotiations.
MR. WEEKES: Can I be retrained?
MR. WOLFF: It is going to be great, so it is a good career path.
MR. SANDS: Last word to Jim Blanchard.
GOVERNOR-AMBASSADOR BLANCHARD: This has been great. I
wanted to mention about talent. All governors spend their time recruiting
business, and I never had a problem. It might sound crazy, but we never had a
problem recruiting businesses to Michigan. As long as we had the talent pool, the
research universities, the community colleges and a reasonable infrastructure,
that was more important than actual cost. Our costs were about average with
most states, but it was the talent, the training, the research, the brainpower.
Talent is where the economy was going to be.
I want to back up because what you said was so simple, yet so profound,
Terry. And you reminded me of something which is, regardless of what the facts
are and how many jobs have been lost and how many have been gained, we
always overstate the benefits of trade deals. You know that. Politicians—and I
used to be one—always overstate the benefits, but you are right when you said
when there are negotiations going on, the elephant in the room, it is always the
threat of moving jobs overseas, and I think every bargaining committee of every
union has that facing them. And I think that probably leads more to the angst
than anything, and I am glad that you reminded me of it.
MR. SANDS: Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in thanking a really
terrific panel. (Applause.)
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: Thanks for your time and attention.
We will take a brief break, try and keep it to ten minutes, and we will come back
with another great panel here. Thank you. (Recess had.) - - - - (Watersheds:
System-Wide Opportunity in the Great-Lakes St. Lawrence)
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: Thank you all, again, for your time
and attention. At this point, we will be turning to an issue concerning national
security. So without further ado, I will give you professor Avi Cover of Case,
and I will let him take over.
PROFESSOR COVER: Good morning. We will be spilling into the
afternoon today. I am thrilled. My name is Avi Cover. I am a professor here at
Case Western. I am thrilled to be moderating, which means as much as possible I
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will merge into the shrubbery here and allow our panelists to run the
conversation.
You know, we have heard a lot of talk of geopolitical nature and in some
cases about the ramifications and diplomacy and trade, and as opposed to in
anyway talking at a 30,000 feet level or even a 10,000 feet level, we are going to
get down to a water level and talk about how government agencies from different
countries can work together seamlessly. So just as we can take some comfort that
the rule of law is, at least, embraced by the vice president, and the Constitution
as well, government agencies are flourishing and working together seamlessly,
ensuring safe rescue operations are taken care of, commerce functions. So I am
going to let our three panelists really educate us all on the system wide
opportunity in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway, and you are going to
hear from three terrific panelists who, as they have related to me, have each other
on speed dial. They work with each other all the time, holler at each other all the
time, and I think you are going to see that that’s evident of their camaraderie and
collegiality today.
So we will hear first from Julie Gascon, who is the Assistant Commissioner
of the Central and Arctic Region for the Canadian Coast Guard. We will then
hear from Betty Sutton, former administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation, and finally Rear Admiral June Ryan, Commander of
the U.S. Coast Guard of the Ninth District. They will each present a little, again,
from this seamless slide presentation, and then we will have a bit of conversation
and allow you also to have some questions as well. So I will turn it over to Julie.
ASST. COMMISSIONER GASCON: Thank you very much. Good morning.
I am thrilled to be here. We will go right into the slide, which is to give you a bit
of background on myself. I am responsible for the Central and Arctic Region for
the Canadian Coast Guard, and I will show you a bit what it looks like in terms
of this territory. But I have a maritime background. I finished my captain’s ticket
in 2005, my master mariner. I was at sea. A lot of people don’t realize this. I
don’t have a beard or a big belly so I go . . . (Laughter.) I go incognito. So, no, I
am very happy to be here, and I hope you will find my presentation interesting.
Okay. So the Canadian Coast Guard, as Canada’s only national civilian fleet,
it is actually one of the largest civilian fleets if you compare it to the other
industry. It covers, of course, the entire territory, and it provides a wide range of
program and services for Canadians. Of course, it provides a wide range of
program and search and rescue, environmental response, but also icebreaking
aids to navigation, maritime security, and we also are a platform for all our
science, for our fishery partners and fisheries management. So we do support
many other government agencies, whether it is Transport Canada, regulators
often come on board, Royal Canadian Mounted Police [(“RCMP”)], our
Fisheries [and Oceans Canada] colleagues, and other colleagues that may need us
as to a platform to reach all waters that are within our territory. Here we go, it
works.
So we provide to the Coast Guard and how it is divided. So in 2012, the
Government of Canada entered into the deficit reduction action plan initiative,
and many departments had to really look at how we are doing programs and how
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we are delivering our services and how to do it more efficiently and more
economically. So the Canadian Coast Guard was originally five regions, and it
went down to three, and I am the region in the middle. So on the western side, it
covers the Pacific Ocean, Great Slave Lake and Mackenzie River and Lake
Winnipeg. The Central and Arctic Region, for which I am responsible, covers the
Hudson Bay, the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River, the Gulf of St. Lawrence
north area, and the Arctic Ocean, both east side and west side.
So I have the privilege to work with two Admirals, Admiral June Ryan,
[who] I love to work with and, of course, Admiral McCallister, who replaced
Admiral Abel in Alaska. So I get that opportunity, so that’s great. The Arctic
Region, it is my colleague on the eastern side, he covers the Atlantic Ocean, the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the Bay of Fundy.
So if we look at the assets that we have in our region, we have got quite a
bit. We have ten operational bases. We have 39 vessels, 15 life boat stations, and
during the summer, they are going to be starting very soon, we have got our
students that provide in-service rescue boats, and this comes at the southern end
of our forces, of our Coast Guard to cover a busy summer season in search and
rescue. We have got two air cushioned vehicles. I have them both on the East
Coast. We have eight helicopters from our region, lots of navigational aids,
whether they are floating or fixed.
There are not many people that notice, but we are a huge construction
company, too. So we own a lot of land. We have a lot of lights on them, and we
provide all the maintenance of those fixed lights. Like you have on the streets,
you have to have lights and stop signs on the water, and you have got a similar
system, all kinds of different systems that helps navigators find their way
through, and we have five traffic service centers. So just like air traffic there is
sea traffic, and I have five marine communication traffic services in my region.
One is seasonal. I have also got two on the St. Lawrence side, and I have got, of
course, Sarnia and Prescott.
So we talked a little bit about the program. This is a great slide. It provides
you really a big overview of all the stuff we do. We do waterways management. I
had forgotten to say this. And while I am driving to a response, it is pretty
obvious an icebreaking operation, marine aids to navigation, communication
traffic, and of course, search and rescue. For the purpose of this presentation, I
am going to delve in more to the Marine Security Enforcement Team and the
program we do there. This is not necessarily the biggest program for the
Canadian Coast Guard. As I said, it is a civilian fleet, but it is going to showcase
how we work with our other federal departments that are responsible for security
to deliver on this very important program. The Marine Security Enforcement
Team is a joint Coast Guard-RCMP program, which provides dedicated on-water
enforcement and response capacity on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence
Seaway area. So there are five dedicated ships, the mid-shore patrol vessel, and
these are specifically built for that enforcement portion of our program, and
what’s interesting is that we have the colors of the Canadian Coast Guard on the
ship but also the colors of the RCMP, so they have their logo and their banner. It
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is quite a nice paint job, and it works well with the colors so it makes it very
evident as well. It is not really good undercover, but we do have onboard
[Mid=Shore Patrol Vessels] (“MSPVs”), the FRCs, the fast rescue craft for the
RCMP, which allows [the] RCMP to move around. It is, I would say, navigated
but driven by Coast Guard officers, and the repairs, we are kind of the taxi
service for them, but they are black so that’s great. So that doesn’t work well,
though when we use the same repairs to do search and rescues, we have
something that we put on the pontoon that brings back all the bright colors of
search and rescue at the forefront. So we work very closely with them to deliver
them that program.
So as I said, maritime security in Canada, it is really a collaboration deal, so
we are bordered by three oceans, and we have the world’s largest coastline,
which measures 243,000 kilometers. We have a relatively small population and a
few on-water assets relative to the enormous geographic size and area of
responsibility that we have to cover. So in order to be able to do the security
portion of our portfolio, we have to collaborate, and it is key on delivering on
that. So there is no single federal department or agency—and we will get to what
that means in real terms—that is responsible for marine security or maritime
security in Canada. So we use a multiagency approach and interface[]
information sharing, and of course, collaboration. So you will see there is a
Department of National Defense; there is the Canadian Coast Guard; there is a
Canada Border Service Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as
Transport Canada.
So the Coast Guard and the Canadian force are the primary generator[s] of
maritime domain awareness [(“MDA”)], because together we have 95 percent of
the maritime sensor and system information to provide to our other colleagues,
which form parts of this multiagency, the main awareness system. Our security
and enforcement partners like the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the
Canadian Border Service Agency rely on Coast Guard to enforce for maritime
domain awareness and information to help fill their mandates. So we, in turn,
rely on them. So the Canadian Border Service Agency would have a lot of
information on cargo and ships that are coming into our waters, so they would
provide that information for Coast Guard since it is really important to know
when there is dangerous cargoes circulating and potential traps in the
environment that this can cause. So this information sharing provides us the
ability to be more efficient in our response capacity.
So a key take away for us in Canada is that the Canadian experience, that
MDA is not achieved through one organization on that information alone; it is
very much really a collaborative effort. So how do we pull it together? So for us,
data is collected, analyzed through a combination of computer integration and
human expertise. In Canada, most of this fusion, especially as it pertains to
security, takes place within Canada’s three interagency marine security operation
centers, and we have called them the MSOCs, which are located on Atlantic,
Pacific Coasts, and Great Lakes. These centers see the location of those five
department agencies that I have showed you and again, the Coast Guard
Canadian force provides 24-7, 365 days a year capacity. So no single department
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or agency owns or directs the activities; rather, each department operates
according to its own mandate, and that looks very beautiful in foreign language,
but in terms of governing sometimes, you know, the tire hits the road, and the
rubber is burning a little bit. Information sharing, according to mandate, yeah, in
theory works well, but you have to want to play ball with each other in order for
it to work. And when you don’t have a leader in an MSOC, it is dependent on the
people that are there, whether the information gets out or not out. So there is still
in my view—and I hope I am not going to burn any bridges with my partners in
other agencies—but in my view, we need to figure out maybe a better approach,
the leadership situation in the MSOC. We achieved it through the [Joint Rescue
Coordination Centre (“JRCC”)] because it is managed and owned by Department
of National Defense, and we had the Maritime Safety portion, but we do report
through that group, through the military, and it provides a clear structure in terms
of governance.
The MSOCs are new. It is well intentioned. It works well, but it is long in
coming and governance is something I think we will need to work on for it to be
more efficient. So each partner brings its information and expertise to the table to
provide, and sharing is key but at times can be difficult. So the responsibility to
ask and respond to an identified issue rests with the department or agency with
the appropriate mandate.
So right off the bat you can see where this can cause an issue. For example,
you have got a boat that is filled with an illegal immigrant that arrives on our
coast. It is a search and rescue, potentially an environmental response, but it
could also be security. So there are so many different agencies that need to work
together and share that information. It could be also health. We had boats that
came in on the West Coast where [tuberculosis] was present. So it is so
multifaceted, and in terms of the security, security, old security agencies like the
one that had done that for a living for years and years because we’re pretty much
a new kid on the block in the security family, they tend to really keep that
information, which is normally secret level, top secret level, and critical
information that is necessary for search and rescue. Or an environmental
response may at times not be shared and could put our own Coast Guard
members at risk when we do those, that work.
So again, the agencies in the government already need to improve in the
years to come. So the MSOC leverage to resources and expertise are partnered to
generate allies and share what is happening in Canadian waters, and that’s done
24-7. So something I am much more familiar with, search and rescue
collaboration is not only limited to maritime security. Of course, it is also at the
heart of many of our programs, including search and rescue, icebreaking, and
aids to navigation. So the Coast Guard is a lead agency for maritime search and
rescue within Canada, and we have, of course, 15 search stations, and the
onshore station with our student[s], and we collaborate with the Royal Canadian
Navy. This is on our military side to provide some crew numbers who are in
rescue for both teams. There is seamless coordination between JRCC Trenton,
and they are relevant, so that’s a Joint Rescue Command Center, and we have
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three in Canada, one in Victoria, one in Trenton, and one in Halifax. I am
responsible for the one in Trenton. Of course, under our military governs and
[J]RCC Cleveland for [search and rescue (“SAR”)] cases in such areas as the
Detroit River, St. Clair River, St. Mary’s River where responders can originate
from either country, and as—there are not many slides left, but as we go through
the slides, I will show you how much the collaboration between Canada and the
United States is essential in areas where we have shared borders in areas like the
Great Lakes.
So there [are] some interesting stats that I want to showcase to you; that
really highlights a collaboration between our two countries, for example, search
and rescue case[s]. So I am going to give you just an outline. So the number of
search and rescue cases that JRCC Trenton, [that is] the Canadian Joint Rescue
Coordination Center, assisted on the U.S. Coast Guard side. So in 2015 that was
213. In 2016, it was 223. So that’s where a case may be occurring, initiated, or
occurring in U.S. waters but where it is coordinated in terms of tasking, whether
a Canadian asset or a U.S. asset by a Canadian center. And the number of search
and rescue cases where the U.S. Coast Guard—and I don’t have the reverse. I am
sorry about that—but where the U.S. Coast Guard [assisted] JRCC Trenton by
sending us some assets to help us out. So in 2015, there were 20 times that the
U.S. sent us an air asset and 30 times where they sent us a vessel, and in 2016, 35
times they sent us an air asset and 42 times where they sent a vessel.
So you can see it doesn’t matter where, often on the Great Lakes. If we need
to assist, we assist, or if the U.S. needs to assist, they assist, and it is truly a
collaborative effort for all search and rescue. Icebreaking is another big one
where we collaborate extensively. Again, the Coast Guard is responsible for
providing icebreaking services throughout the Great Lakes. So we have two
vessels, the Griffon [and] the Samuel Risley, that [are] above the locks. The
Martha [L.] Black, the Pierre Radisson, the Des Groseilliers, and the Amundsen
are below the lock[s], but at times we saw in 2015, ‘14 or ‘15, we came into
White Fish Bay, and there was a huge plug. Everybody was stuck there, and the
Radisson came in and got everybody out. So we worked really, really together,
whether you are a U.S. ship or Canadian ship, it doesn’t matter. When there is an
icebreaker, at times it could be a Canadian icebreaker or a U.S. icebreaker, we
work together to get it done.
And we work together, and I know it may not mean much to some of you in
the room, but we work together for all the flushing operation[s]. That’s literally
what it sounds like, so we flushed the ice out from the St. Clair Lake, the Detroit
River, the St. Clair River, so we will position our asset to break ice. There are
other assets, U.S. or Canadian, that are at the bottom or the top, and we literally
flush the ice out of the system, so its vessels can transit more easily, and to do
this, we have what we call coordination calls. So there is a call that is mostly by
the U.S. Coast Guard, and we do it jointly with the Canadian Coast Guard, and
all the industry comes in every morning during ice season in the Great Lakes,
and then we provide where are the assets, where is it planned for today, and
where we intend to be tomorrow. And the industry can then chime in and say, for
example, well, I am going to be longer, maybe we will need an icebreaker faster

92

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42, 2018]

so people can actually collaborate and work more effectively to dispatch a
resource where they are needed.
We do the same thing below the locks. We have an ice call with my
colleague on the East Coast, and soon, in June, I am going to be starting the ice
call for the Arctic season because I covered two ice seasons, one in the Arctic
and one south. I always have ice. Mind you, it is warming up a little bit, so I am
getting less and less. So it is really a zonal approach to service provision, so we
are dispatching the best asset to do the job at the best time, and that can be on the
Great Lakes—U.S. or Canadian asset—where we work together on that.
So just two more slides. Aids to navigation. So we are responsible for
providing and maintaining aids [to] navigation services throughout the Great
Lakes. Literally speaking, you will find, again, the same vessels that I talked
about, and it is really a collaborative approach to service provision. It is
coordinated as well again between the U.S. and Canadian because some buoys
may be placed on U.S. water or Canadian water. Ships normally leaving from
each of our countries, place their own, but, for example, I had a lot of
breakdowns this year. I called my favorite admiral, and I just say “could I please
have some help to place some of our buoys?” And the U.S. Coast Guard came to
the rescue and is helping us out placing our buoys in the water. So it is really a
collaborative effort when one or the other is running into issue, we call each
other, and we work together very, very closely pretty much on everything we do
in the Great Lakes.
So last slide I want to talk to you about is safety and security through
collaboration waterways management. So [trade on] the Great Lakes can really
only occur through the St. Lawrence Seaway. A lot of the trade goes through the
Seaway and into the Great Lakes, and because I cover the St. Lawrence River as
well, I look at it as a complete continuum. So it needs to all work together. A lot
of “salties” (i.e. Ocean-Going Vessels) come in the Great Lakes and go out, and
they bring goods and access the port more easily going through that system. So
when you are looking at it—and I hope in the future we will be able to really
push on this—if you look at it as the backdrop that is Ontario and all the Great
Lakes, it makes a whole continuum of a corridor that can be used efficiently, to
move goods and cargo in and out of the United States, but also of Canada when it
comes to Quebec and Ontario.
So dredging is key in the St. Lawrence River. It is all one water column. If
you are missing water, you can’t bring the cargo in, so dredging is extremely
important. We have an aging infrastructure that we need to refurbish, mainly
rivers, for example, that keep water levels up. So waterways management is a
big, big component of our program, but it is not well, necessarily, understood,
even in my own town. So I will be presenting [to] senior level of the Canadian
Coast Guard because what we do on the St. Lawrence River has impact, huge
impact on the Great Lakes and on the economies.
Of course, there are many shoals and with construction they are removed,
and the canal remains wide enough to accommodate vessels passing one another,
and there is a bigger vessel coming in now through the waterway, so we need to
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make sure the dredging is done as well for us in the Seaway and the Great Lakes.
Last year we dredged 3,179,132 cubic feet. Looks big on paper. Nothing
compared to the amount of dredging on the U.S. side, which is in the billions of
tons, but we do try to do our best on our side as well. The budget is significant on
the U.S. side. On the Canadian side, it is probably nowhere near as much.
So there was a picture I think—there it is. This is how dredging looks like,
so it is basically how it looks from the bottom. So that works well when you have
a soft bottom. Of course, though, there’s a lot of push right now on our
organization to do specific dredging and to really blast rocky shoals so we can
have a better even bottom so the vessels can transit. So that pretty much covers
it.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: Thank you very much, Ms. Gascon. I am
Betty Sutton, and I am the former Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation. I just want to make it clear, I think somebody else
earlier might have said they were here as a citizen. I am here as a citizen. But I
held this job until January 20th, and I am delighted to be able to be here with my
two former partners to share with you the way that we collaborate and make
things work on the St. Lawrence Seaway and in the Great Lakes for the entire
region in both of our nations.
What is the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation or the SLSDC?
It is a wholly-owned government corporation, so it is a bit unique unlike many
government agencies. It has much greater flexibilities. We are charged, or they
are charged, with operating and maintaining the U.S. infrastructure and the
waters of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the U.S. portion. As a corporation, as I
indicated, there is greater flexibility for the SLSDC than you might find in other
agencies. For example, we can deal directly with our partners in Canada, in many
cases outside of the State Department. So there is some level of diplomacy and
partnership in which we engage. We work hand in hand with the St. Lawrence
Seaway Management Corporation, which is responsible for operating the
infrastructure in the Canadian portion of the Seaway.
Now, when you look[ed] at some of the slides before about the geography
that we are dealing with, but our primary responsibilities are for the lock
operations, vessel traffic control. We do trade promotion and economic
development, and we are also engaged in a capital investment renewal program.
All of these things are done on the U.S. side, and they are done together in many
cases with our Canadian partners. We operate two locks in Messina, New York,
on the U.S. side. The Canadian corporation operates thirteen locks. You would
think that that is a big responsibility, and yes, it is. It takes 24 hours a day, seven
days a week cooperation. The Seaway never ever sleeps. I can attest to that,
believe me. Those calls come in at all times. But it really is an amazing thing
because that coordination is required, because if something stops in one of the
Canadian locks, we have to know immediately. We work very closely with our
partners in both Coast Guards on both sides of the border as well as other federal
agencies, both on the U.S. side and the Canadian side of the border.
The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation is not a mirror image of
the St. Lawrence Seaway Management Corporation, which exists on the
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Canadian side of the border. So they actually manage the locks and the
operations on the Canadian side under a contract with Transport Canada. So that
makes it—another partner is Transport Canada who we sometimes will deal with
as well. Not only do we operate promotional or operationally with the Canadian
Seaway, we are a model of international partnership in many dimensions.
The Seaway was created by an exchange of diplomatic notes that had the
effect of a treaty way back in the 1950s. And frankly, it has continued to operate
in many ways on that same basis with exchanges of notes and constant
cooperation. It is certainly a testament to the shared values of our countries. It is
a testament to the shared vision for economic opportunities into the heartland of
North America, and as you see displayed here on this panel today, our shared
concern for security, for both of our nations. So when you take a look at the
geography, you can see the importance that binational cooperation is essential
just due to the geographic and physical characteristics.
Here we have two nations, eight states, two Canadian provinces, tribal lands,
and local governments, and that makes for an interesting mix of making things
work. But yet, we do. You probably don’t hear a lot about the St. Lawrence
Seaway Development Corporation, do you? Yeah. That’s because it is operating
so well. You cross the border 27 times when you come to this system, and our
goal is that you will not feel like you are crossing the border 27 times or even
once, quite frankly. We like to work in sync that well, and it is imperative. These
characteristics of geography make it—binational cooperation—not just desirable
but required.
On the ease of maritime commerce from Europe and other destinations to
capable Great Lakes borders provides [sic] us with a real opportunity right here
in North America, and we service about 33 major ports, and in those ports they
are all different. They all have unique merits, and part of our job at the St.
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation is not just to operate the waterway
for the sake of operating it; it is so that we can support economic activity in the
Great Lakes region and in both of our nations. So we have, in fact, established at
the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation an outreach initiative with
an office right here in Cleveland. That’s something that I am proud of as the
former administrator, because when I entered the position, we had operations, the
locks that I mentioned, that we were operating in Messina, New York. We were
headquartered in Washington, D.C., but I said, who do we have in the [Great]
Lakes? We didn’t have anyone in the Lakes. So now we have an office right here
in Cleveland where our representative goes out and works with the ports, [to] try
and help them achieve their vision for their communities.
When you look at our seaway locks, as I mentioned, there are 15 in total.
This is a deep draft waterway, certainly a vital economic waterway. There are
restrictions on the size of the vessels that can come into the Seaway. The
dimensions are 740 feet long and 80 feet wide, so you are not going to see those
great, great big ships coming into the waterway. Each lock empties and fills 22
million gallons of water and takes a vessel [sic] about ten minutes to raise and
lower a vessel. We are open—last year tied the longest season on record—we are
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open almost ten months a year, and we do have to be very conservative with
making sure we are looking at what weather we can see coming, as well as the
environmental implications that might arise, either at the beginning or the end of
a season.
In addition to the locks, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation
also owns other property and has other responsibilities. We care for a tunnel as
well as have an interest in the Seaway International Bridge. So that makes, again,
us a little bit different.
So why is it important? And I think Ms. Gascon put it very well when she
was talking about the need to look at the Great Lakes Region as a region and as a
regional power. If the region was viewed as a country, we would be the third
largest economy in the world behind only the U.S. and China. That’s significant,
and I don’t think that we always look at ourselves that way.
One of the things that has always bothered me is that we refer to this
magnificent part of the country as the “Rust Belt.” That just doesn’t do justice for
our communities. It doesn’t do justice for the size of this economy or the
potential that we have to offer. So that’s one of the things that I certainly want to
change, both as the former administrator in every dimension because we have a
tremendous amount of opportunity and a unique endowment in the Great Lakes
and the St. Lawrence Seaway, not only as a waterway for commerce but sitting
along the shores of one-fifth of the world’s fresh water. So “Opportunity Belt” is
what I think we should call this part of the country. We are home to more than a
hundred million people, nearly 25 percent of North America’s population. The
Seaway supports the manufacturing and the agricultural hub of North America.
We produce two-thirds of Canada’s industrial outlet in this region. We grow
almost half the soybean and corn in the U.S. in this region. We account for some
40 percent of the U.S. manufacturing in this region, so half of the Fortune 500
industrial companies are headquartered here. So again, I think it is time to retire
the term “Rust Belt.” I say we don’t call the South the “Sun Belt.” I don’t think
we should because I don’t think it would do them justice any more than the term
“Rust Belt” does our community or our state or our people justice.
When you look at the benefits of Great Lakes Seaway commercial shipping,
I think it is really important to realize that we are also the environmental
gatekeepers to the Great Lakes from the Atlantic side. And so we take that very
seriously, and I know Admiral Ryan is going to talk about one of the programs
that we do in conjunction with both of the Coast Guards related to invasive
species and ballast water. But just looking at it, we are called to provide a safe,
efficient, reliable waterway in our mission at the SLSDC, and certainly, that is
accomplished. The safety record on ships is extraordinary. It by far outpaces
other modes of transport, but when you look even further than that commercial
shipping on the Great Lakes Seaway system provides approximately $4 billion
dollars in annual transportation cost savings, and the Great Lakes Seaway fleet is
nearly seven times more fuel efficient than trucks and 1.14 times more fuel
efficient than rail. It would take 3 million rail cars or 7.1 million trucks to carry
the total cargo transported by the Great Lakes Seaway fleet.
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So if you think about that, you think about not only the environmental
advantages of shipping, we also, through the Seaway, have 50 percent more
capacity that we could handle without additional investments in the waterways.
So think about that in terms of getting some of our overcrowded highways and
some of the congestion there taken off of our roadways and, frankly, the
infrastructure costs that go with that. So I think a lot of people don’t realize the
environmental advantages of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation.
With that, that’s just a little introduction to who we are and what we do, a
model agency with big international responsibilities, and we are honored to be
here and partner with the Coast Guard once again.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: Okay. So my name is Admiral June Ryan, and I
am the regional commander, if you will, for the Great Lakes, all Great Lakes
from Messina, New York, all the way to Lake of the Woods, North Dakota. And
I am going to abbreviate mine because one good thing about being third is that
much of our shared economy is also our shared gap. So I will not repeat all that,
but first of all, I just want to say thank you so much for inviting the three of us to
come in and brag a little bit about what we do every day and what I know our
people do every day for both economies.
So they already talked about this. We call it “shared, saltless, seasonal, and
system,” and so what I like to also show, a lot of people don’t realize how very
large the Great Lakes are. So traveling from Duluth, Minnesota, over to the St.
Mary’s River, over to [Sault Ste. Marie (“the Soo”)] is like traveling from Miami
to the middle of South Carolina—and you see Lake Michigan—over to Lake
Michigan and takes all the way up to the Eastern Seaboard. And so a lot of times
when you see it in the graphic of where it is, it doesn’t look that large, but we are
larger than the entire Eastern Seaboard.
We have already talked about the importance of the trade, and so I really
won’t speak to this, other than to say that over 270 treaties drive our international
relationship, and that also includes our recreational. So we talked a little bit about
the joint search and rescue that we have, and that’s very important when you
consider that one quarter of all the recreational boats in the United States are here
on the Great Lakes. So when you are in the search and rescue agency that is
responsible for that, that tends to be a very busy part of our lives. Last year we
saved about 600 people, assisted over 7,000, and twelve million dollars’ worth of
property.
We also have a Coast Guard auxiliary similar to the Canadian Coast Guard
that helps. That’s our volunteer armed Coast Guard.
So this is kind of our force laid down. The green dots are stations. These
stations were established back, many of them back in the 1800s when we were
rowing boats, and it is very difficult to sometimes close a station just like it is
very difficult to close a post office or a firehouse. So although we ha[ve]
motorboats that can actually travel much quicker, much faster, we have been
challenged to do that. The yellow dots are where our air stations are. We have
two of them that are seasonal and then two that are permanent—in Traverse City,
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which is up here and then down in Detroit. The star, of course, is my
headquarters. I am headquartered here in Cleveland, and then the red triangles
are where our ships are located. So these are some of the boats that you might see
on the water as we interact with the recreational boating as well as the
commercial boating.
Those same people that run the search and rescue stations also run our ice
rescue. We in the Ninth District have the only ice rescue school for the United
States. We actually train and travel internationally to teach people in Finland and
up in Alaska how to also do ice rescue. So we use airboats—we use our cutters,
as well as literally people right on the ice. Our helicopters are also a major asset.
As we talked about, we do not have any fixed wing assets on the U.S. side in the
Great Lakes, so we do 100 percent of the time rely on the Canadian Coast Guard
to launch a fixed wing asset when we need it and vice versa. When they need a
helicopter, we will launch our helicopters. The biggest disadvantage of our
helicopters is they cannot work in icy conditions. That’s a huge pain when you
have a big winter. So we are actually converting air station Traverse City. This
year they will get 60s, which are like Blackhawks. And we will get them this
summer. So not only do they have an increased range, but they are also able to
operate in icy conditions.
We also have a very active commercial vessel side as we talked about, the
Seaway and all of the commercial vessels. We make sure when—I tell everybody
if you have ever been on a cruise ship, if you have ever been on a dinner cruise,
the Coast Guard has been there first. So we are the agency that makes sure
people are licensed; that they are able to do their—launch their rescue boats if
something happens, and if they need to do a man overboard, all of those things—
we are the ones that run them through all of those drills.
We also do, as Betty Sutton mentioned, the ballast water inspection. So, in
Montreal, we have U.S. Coast Guard and Canadians both go aboard salties that
are coming in, and we make sure that the ballast water is salt water and not fresh
water. So when a ship travels the world, right, they go into a river system, and
they have to take on ballast water, that is fresh water. If that then gets dumped
into the Great Lakes, you would have sometimes aquatic species that get []
introduced into the Great Lakes. So we make sure that they do what is called a
“ballast water exchange” as they are coming through the Seaway. If they get all
the way to Montreal and they have fresh water on board, they have two choices:
They can go all the way back out the Seaway, which is really economically not
the best thing that they would like to do, or we can padlock it, and they will
padlock it. And the whole time [the ship is] in the Great Lakes they cannot
exchange ballast water until they come back out.
So last year we inspected over 8,000 ballast tanks on 466 ships. We had a 99
percent compliance rate and 100 percent of the ones that we padlocked came
back out the Seaway and still had them padlocked, and we do check the salinity
and everything and the chemical compounds, make sure they didn’t, you know,
un-padlock it and dump it and bring back [sic]. So we have all the chemical
means and fingerprinting to make sure that doesn’t happen. So it is a really
successful program. We have been doing that for eleven years and very proud to
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say in eleven years not one new aquatic species has been introduced to the Great
Lakes since we have been doing that joint venture between all three of our
agencies.
We have already mentioned the joint collaborations in icebreaking. Two
billion dollars of economy does still move on the Great Lakes during
icebreaking. We do that with our cutters. And of course, it is an important part of
the economy; and it doesn’t matter. As Ms. Gascon already described, we escort
Canadian ships. We will escort salties. We will escort U.S. ships and vice versa.
So we are flag-lined. She already mentioned the aids to navigation, and we also
have many aids to navigation that we apply.
One thing I wanted to mention is—something that is very unique—is called
Shiprider Program. On the law enforcement side, it is still an international
brotherhood. You cannot cross an international brotherhood. Bad guys don’t
necessarily listen to rules, right? And so they can basically exploit the
[international boundary] lines. So if you are in a small boat and you are trying to
smuggle or trying to do something illegal, all you have to do is cross over the
line, and I, as a law enforcement person carrying a weapon, have to stop at that
imaginary line. That is until our countries signed a joint agreement, and we now
have Shiprider. So a Royal Canadian Mounted Police will ride a small Coast
Guard cutter, and then if a small boat tries to cross the line, we can follow that
over to the Canadian side, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police will then
execute all of the Canadian laws and vice versa. We will send a Coast Guard
person over to a Royal Canadian Mounted Police station. They will ride the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police small boat. They will do a patrol, and if a small
boat tries to exploit the line, they come over, and the U.S. Coast Guard then
executes all of our law enforcement.
And so I just wanted to set out and describe a little bit, we have already
described so much of what we do. Together we also do pollution, a lot of
pollution responses together. When a ship goes aground and spills oil, it is not
just a Canadian problem, and it is not just a U.S. problem, if it is on the side
because, obviously, the oil is going to be everywhere, and so we do that. Aids
navigation, icebreaking, law enforcement, border protection, we already talked
about the ballast water and the aquatic nuisance species, and we are also working
together as it relates to the Asian carp, which, of course, does not come in to
ballast water, ships or through the Seaway, coming up through the river system,
but it just gives you some idea of our operations as it relates to how we operate.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR COVER: Terrific. Thank you all so much. I am wondering if
we might talk a little bit about here we have this thirty-five billion dollar revenue
at stake in this coordinated economy, what you see as some of both the
advantages of this region for commerce but also some of the challenges.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: Well, a couple of things. I should say this:
227,000 jobs in the U.S. and Canada rely on Great Lakes Seaway shipping, and
that’s just directly, you know, involved with the shipping aspect. But I think one
of the great challenges and the great opportunities is that is our vision and
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whether or not we look at ourselves regionally as the agricultural hub, as the
manufacturing hub of North America. I went to a meeting—just as a little
anecdote—not all that long ago right here in Cleveland where a major
manufacturer said, well, you know, somebody wanted to build something here,
manufacture something here, but we don’t have water access. And I said yes,
yes, yes, we do have water access. So I think it is opening up the minds about the
potential and the opportunity that this region has and thinking of the Seaway and
the system in a new way.
One of the things that is happening right here locally is the Port Authority,
and Cuyahoga County, has established a liner service that is scheduled, that goes
from Cleveland to Antwerp every few weeks. So now manufacturers can rely on
that if they want to export goods in containers. So now containers are on the
Great Lakes, which is something very new, and that’s a very missionary thing
that the Port is engaged in. Bulk commodities moving on the Great Lakes and in
the Seaway are still the bread and butter of the system. But the challenge and the
opportunity is to diversify cargoes, not just with that liner service, but also
cruising on the Great Lakes is a burgeoning opportunity that many communities
are trying to avail themselves of, and some of the work that the Coast Guard and
the border patrol officials do will have a big interplay on how successful we are
at being able to do that given the geography and the boundary.
So I think it is just opening ourselves up to the idea that the way we have
always done things isn’t all that we can do. We can do more, and so we are just
exploring that and grabbing for that potential.
PROFESSOR COVER: Julie, do you have . . .
ASST. COMMISSIONER GASCON: I am sorry. From our part is that how
do we support and respond to growth and opportunities as Betty has described it.
So there is aging infrastructure, assets also are aged, but it is to bring people to
realize if, for example, you had a light that goes off and you are driving and one
of the lights doesn’t work and the cop is doing the traffic, there is a huge backup.
So if you don’t have the proper aids to navigation, that is also what happens. If
you have on a highway like a sinkhole and people stop the highway to go
through, well, if you have not dredged appropriately, you can’t get the ships
through. So all this works together. If you don’t have a snowplow on a highway,
the highway closes. If you don’t have an icebreaker in the river or in the lakes,
the trade stops, right? And everybody gets clogged out, the same way it is on the
highway, and that dialogue or that understanding of the importance of the Coast
Guard and Corps of Engineers and U.S. Coast Guard, of course, in ensuring that
we can respond to this opportunity and this growth that I think the Great Lakes
will bring to reduce issues such as congestion, we as an agency have to be ready
to respond to that, and it is going really, really fast.
People are understanding more and more of the opportunities, the corridors
that can be created with the St. Lawrence River, the Seaway and the Great Lakes,
and we need to position ourselves to be able to respond to the demand. That’s my
biggest fear. The biggest issues that I am facing every day, weather—and I had a
big issue in deciding about ice this year— and other issues. Right at the opening
of the Seaway, we had issues all the way till Sunday, and we will be able to
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support and open in time, but this is my day to day, and I respond to meetings
and Corps and everything--”How about when am I going to get new icebreakers?
Why do you have a vessel that is down? Why were you not able to respond to
that service,” and trying to always, always keep up with the demand that just
keeps on going.
So for us, it is going to be the challenge for the Coast Guard. We are always
setting ourselves up with the Oceans Protection Plan that our Prime Minister
announced, $1.5 billion of investment. I think that we are on the right path.
Hopefully, it will be fast enough, but that dialogue, convincing people, making
people understand that an icebreaker equals big snow plow, [is] not really in the
dialogue of everybody.
PROFESSOR COVER: Admiral Ryan?
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I think the other thing—and I recently did a
calculation—Ms. Sutton put up the diagram about one ship equals so many rail
cars, equals so many trucks. If you think about it, one ship equals an 18-wheeler
from here to Vermilion in a line with no space in between. And we had
thousands and thousands of transits on the Great Lakes every day that keep all of
those trucks off of the highway. So think about it, if something goes down and
we can no longer move grain by ship and now we have to move it by truck, it
will equal from here to Vermilion a continuous line, right, a caravan of those.
Think about it also in terms of pipeline. You know, you hear about some of
the pipeline that would also be, but then you reverse that with what Betty is
talking about, the opportunity. How many could we take off the roads if we just
put one more ship with all the commodities that those 18-wheelers are carrying?
And so I think that’s where it kind of plays both sides, and it does take
investment.
PROFESSOR COVER: How do we overcome—I think you mentioned 27
border crossings occur. How does one deal—I imagine—with the bureaucracy
that comes with that?
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: Well, I think a good way to look at that is
in the cruising kind of a component. When we were actively trying to get folks to
come in to the Great Lakes to cruise, certainly when people are crossing the
border 27 times, they are not going to want to be checked by a custom border
patrol 27 times or even a few times when they drove into port, right? So we
worked out a program that enabled us, once they come into the system, to treat
them a little bit differently.
I won’t get into too much specifics, but we had some of the programs that
had been described by our Coast Guard officials explained how we do that, too.
The joint partnership, the ability to secure the border that they engage in with the
Shiprider Program, all of those things are aimed at finding ways in this unique
partnership that we have with our neighbor to the north, that enable us to do that
and capitalize on the potential.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: You had a question over here. Did you want to
go the other way?
PROFESSOR COVER: Sure, we will go up. Yes, please?
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AUDIENCE MEMEBER: So yeah, we heard a lot of negative things about
climate change. I am just wondering if climate change is a positive opportunity
for the Seaway and how that might be working into considerations about maybe
an all-season operation.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: Well, I think those are two different
questions, but I would say absolutely on the first part of your question. This is an
environmentally sound mode of transportation that, as we become more
concerned with CO2 emissions, you have to look at water transport as an
alternative.
To the question about looking at what are our opportunities and our
challenges, we are using just the profile and benefits of maritime shipping, it’s a
challenge. It’s kind of an old industry. It’s kind of like trying to keep your head
down when you are maritime. You don’t want anyone to notice you, but we can’t
do that now. I do think it offers maritime a great opportunity if you are
concerned about CO2, and as I said, it’s also very safe by comparison to the
other modes of transportation.
In terms of all-season operation through the locks, during the winter when
the Seaway is closed, and it is usually, we can’t control the weather, there is also
work that is done on the last-end infrastructure. We are in the middle [of] a
renewal program, a multiyear asset renewal program, which, frankly, there is a
lot of investment being made on both sides of the border. That’s a testament to
the vitality of the waterway and its potential and how our policymakers see that
potential. So we would need that time, some of that time for winter work, but
there are a lot of factors that go into when the waterway opens and closes,
environmental considerations, considerations and discussions with others who, as
I said, you can imagine the complications of governance when you have all of
the jurisdictions that are involved in bordering the waterway. But we have
extended the length of the season. I think that those discussions are always going
on, and if it can be done environmentally sound in a way as well as allow for the
infrastructure to be maintained as it should be, it’s an open question for the
future.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I would say also, just to add, icebreaking is not
always positive to most people. An ice fisherman does not like to see an
icebreaker coming up. (Laughter.)
So people actually wait for the waterway to freeze over so they can actually
go across back and forth and use it as a roadway. It’s very interesting.
GOVERNOR-AMBASSADOR BLANCHARD: Regarding locks, the
current governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, and our two senators, as Senators
Stabenow and Peters are very worried about the need for an additional lock at the
Soo lock. The current Poe lock, P-o-e, handles [the] Nader ships, but if
something happened to that, we wouldn’t be able to accommodate iron ore, and
about two-thirds of the steel industry in the United States would shut down.
What are the costs? I mean, this is a long-term thing, and I know it involves the
Corps of Engineers, but what are the prospects for getting this new additional
lock to avoid a potential catastrophe?
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ADMIRAL RYAN: I am probably best to answer that. So I have, I wish my
Army Corps of Engineer[s] colleague was here, but I will say, as you know, one
of the priorities for the new administration for President Trump has been
increased infrastructure, and the Soo lock is on that priority list. And so we
finally have raised it. I know Betty had for multiple years. Many of the admirals
in Canada have had this discussion for ten or twenty years. The fact that it is on a
presidential list and on a priority list and is on the Army Corps of Engineers
study to hopefully begin construction within five to ten years is a positive move
forward.
GOVERNOR-AMBASSADOR BLANCHARD: Is that list real, or is that a
real list?
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I understand it to be real. I know it is real on the
Army Corps’ side. It’s very real on the Army Corps’ side.
GOVERNOR-AMBASSADOR BLANCHARD: Good.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: If I might just augment that, before I was
administ[rator], I was a member of Congress, and Congress is obviously very
interested in this. I knew this was going to come up. When the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security looked at it, it painted a pretty dire picture should that lock
go down. Eleven million jobs lost, a crippled auto industry from lack of steel, as
the former governor there tells us, and a likely economic recession in 2018.
That’s a big deal, and I think this goes to the discussion up here about how if we
act as a region on the political level, that’s likely to help us get to where we’re
going.
So this idea, and Congress has started to look at the Great Lakes Seaway
system as a region, is beneficial not only to the waterway, but certainly to the
ability to access successfully the kind of support for infrastructure that we need,
because there is more political clout together than there is individually. So it’s on
the right track.
MINISTER JIM PETERSON: You mentioned that there is one container
ship that went through the locks. Am I assuming that all the other ships that work
in the waterway are modal carriers? What kind of cargo is that, and where is
most of the traffic? How much of that would originate up to the far western end,
and where does it go? And do they unload for transatlantic, put it through another
ship for transatlantic, or other type of carriage?
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: The container ships, there is more than
one ship that is in this system with containers, but it’s a scheduled liner service,
so I don’t know if they’re operating. Since I left, I mean. There are three that are
operating sort of monthly, and that is a new and growing, hopefully, venture.
With respect to major commodities that come through the system, iron ore,
grain, break bulk cargo, mining products, including stone and sand and gravel,
dry bulk cargoes, and there are a lot, there is also a growing general cargo kind
of commodity as well as project cargo, but they transport both traditional energy
as well as new energy, like wind turbines. There is talk, for example, here in
Cleveland about LEEDCo developing some wind energy perhaps off the shores
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of Lake Erie. That would create a whole new industry to be serviced by moving
it on the Great Lakes and through the Seaway.
So it’s a mix of things, but certainly bulk and break bulk cargo are the bread
and butter of what Great Lakes shipping has been in the past. It’s important, as
certain commodities tend to fall off due to whatever reasons, sometimes
intentional policies, sometimes market conditions, that we find ways to capitalize
on this, our unique endowment in utilizing our waterway and our responsibility
way into the future. So there’s kind of a moment of creativity that is happening
on the Great Lakes, and success breeds success, so that liner services have really
set off a spark for people to look at new ways to use the waterway and the
system.
PROFESSOR COVER: Another question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So I apologize for a very easy question, but being a
law student, I don’t have much time for the generalities of life. (Laughter.)
So I know, and I appreciate Admiral Ryan’s opinion as well, the Transport
Canada report on the Coast Guard, I think that came out 2016, was not terribly
complementary, at least in my reading of it. And one of the major issues and
inefficiencies they pointed at was the lack of a law enforcement mandate to the
Coast Guard and the fact that, in order for the Coast Guard to enforce, the
Canadian Coast Guard to enforce sovereignty, there needs to be a law
enforcement officer aboard. I’m just curious how would that help or hinder the
collaboration that you have with the U.S. Coast Guard? I mean, what’s it like, the
fact that the U.S. Coast Guard is being our armed service and a civilian fleet
interacting with an international police force and all those issues you were
chatting about earlier? I’m just curious if Parliament were give the Coast Guard
that mandate, what would that look like going forward, or is it worth giving it
that mandate?
ASST COMMISSIONER GASCON: It’s a good question. I won’t be able to
answer your question directly. The Canadian Coast Guard is truly a civilian fleet.
As I said, the security role of the Coast Guard really came into play after 9/11.
So when that security portfolio started coming in, marine security was created as
well as Transport Canada. So for us, I call ourselves the new kids on the block of
security when it comes to that arena in Canada.
But one thing that I have to say is that when I meet with Admiral Ryan or
Admiral McAllister, if I would like to meet with them and have all the different
things that the U.S. Coast Guard do in the same room. So, for example, we are
going to be having the Coast Guard Summit this year, we have to bring to the
table Transport Canada and the RCMP, and potentially CBSA as well, at the
same table in order to be able to speak on all facets of what the U.S. Coast Guard
mandate is.
So in terms of our relationship, I think our relationship will always be very
strong, but what we have done, when I look at the Shiprider, when I look at our
major patrol vessel, which carries our RCMP, is that we do also provide a
conduit because we have a very, very strong bond. But we also bring the other
agency as kind of a conduit to say, okay, well, this would be this agency, and
here we are introducing those folks and providing that relationship. So we have
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been working that way for decades and have always been that way. The U.S.
Coast Guard welcomed us onto the security portfolio and has provided a lot of
support through a shipriding program and all kinds of different programs.
I don’t know that it would change anything in the relationship. It could make
it easier because instead of speaking to 40, we speak to one, but we have made
do with it, and we have done it well. And our U.S. Coast Guard colleagues
understand exactly the structure that we have because we are so close. So it has
never been an issue. With regards to that report, this is always on the table. It
always come[s] back on the table: Should the Coast Guard be military? Many of
the world’s Coast Guards are militarized, but this is not the model that we
currently have in Canada, and I am not sure whether it will ever change.
PROFESSOR COVER: Admiral, do you have anything to add?
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I would just say we on the U.S. side, and I speak
for my members, we appreciate the fact that we are both a police agency, we are
a regulating issue as she discussed with Transport Canada, we are also an armed
service and all of those things collectively. So we can go globally, for example,
to interdict pirates off the coast of Africa, and we serve under the theater
commander, the [Department of Defense (“DoD”)] theater commander when we
are in theater. We can actually shoot and take out the pirates, and then we
immediately shift to our law enforcement mode because, of course, the next
thing we want to do is take those to justice that are either still alive or the
organizers. We immediately go into law enforcement mode. We don’t need
another set of orders unlike our Department of Defense counter parts. We don’t
need a different mandate. We go on board. We are now a law enforcement
investigating agency.
We put the case package together, and I give it to Ted Fowles, my Judge
Advocate General, my lawyer, and then he determines at what point I shifted
from being a theater commander from my Department of Defense authorities to
my law enforcement authorities. That’s for the lawyers to all work out at the end
of the day, and the good thing for members, we don’t have to do any of that.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: That’s great.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: So for us, we enjoy that as a spectrum. That’s
how we look at it.
MR. HERMAN: Thank you very much for the wonderful panel. It is very
impressive, the three of you up there talking about the Great Lakes. We really
appreciate it. You mentioned a staggering number of treaties and international
agreements that you operate under to do the things that you have to do. Is that
tough to manage and negotiate? Does it take a lot of effort to figure out what you
are allowed to do when and who you need to talk to? And if you had a wish list
on how to coordinate all that or, you know, distill it down to one agreement,
what would that be?
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I will start and then hand it over to Ms. Gascon. I
would say for me, as an operator, it’s seamless. For example, the bilateral
agreement that put shiprider into play, it’s out there, and there is an authority out
there by which we execute under, but I don’t think about that authority, and I
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don’t think about the treaty, and I don’t reference it at all. When I’m on the
water, I know that if I have an RCMP officer, I can go on either side of the
border, and if they have a Coast Guard person, they can go on either side of the
border.
So perhaps that’s back up to the 50,000 level that you talked about as
opposed to the water level, and so for us, of course, we need to have all that
authority and background behind it, but on a day-to-day basis. Ted, did you want
to talk about that on the legal side at all?
COMMANDER FOWLES: Well, for the lawyers in the room, the good
news is in the construct we provide legal advice, and if they are on the water and
they have a legal question, there’s always a lawyer 24/7. So I think that gives
them a comfort level that they’re operating within the bounds of the law.
Then, since we’re talking about Shiprider, one of the unique things you have
to do is send people to train down at the Maritime Law Enforcement Center in
Charleston, South Carolina. If you haven’t gone to that training, you cannot get
on the platform, which includes very important people on both sides of the
border, so we have had Ministers and Congressional representatives that want to
do a ride-along, they can’t get on there. So both countries have really
implemented a pretty strict regime to make sure that they appreciate and
recognize and comply with laws on both sides of the border. Hopefully, that
answers your question, and I can talk to you offline.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: Julie?
ASST COMMISSIONER GASCON: Just to echo what Admiral Ryan is
saying, like on the environmental side, we have an agreement for environmental
response, and our response capacity, this would allow us, when the [Roger]
Blough went aground, the bow was in Canada, and the steering was in the United
States. Okay. How do you manage that? I called June, and June called me, “who
is taking this one?” Whoever takes the lead, the other sends a resource to
support. Especially when we had issues with buoys and Admiral Ryan came to
support us, and it’s vice versa. It’s always together, so under those agreements, I
don’t think about it when we’re in operations. I just know that if I call, I can have
those discussions, and we can manage the incident together without any issues.
Perhaps I think one big agreement could help put that altogether, but in our view,
a lot of those agreements are negotiated agency to agency, from Canadian Coast
Guard and U.S. Coast Guard, so it doesn’t involve the big boys of international
affairs, I guess. I don’t know how to describe it, and it goes a little faster.
(Laughter.)
I am sure the Minister has been there. Sorry about that, Minister, but it does
go a lot faster, and it does keep it simple. And it does keep it really operational,
and that’s what allows us to work efficiently. When the treaty involves more
resources and everything, of course, international affairs is to be involved in that,
but those operational agreements and traditional memorandums of
understanding, whatever you call them, allow us to be able to collaborate
seamlessly on the Lakes anyway.
MR. WEEKES: To what extent does the Regulatory Cooperation Council
factor into this?
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ASST COMMISSIONER GASCON: If I may, I used to be with Transport
Canada on the regulatory side, so I was often on a [sic] various RCC Task
Force[s]. I found that the Regulatory Council, Cooperation Council, what it
brought to bear is that when both agencies don’t have a regulation, the
opportunity to have something that is similar to be drafted or something that is
seamless between the two nations, really it’s a great approach. I was on various
equipment, all kinds of different regulatory projects in my former job. The
Regulatory Cooperation Council becomes harder when each of us already have a
regulation in place that differs. So it allows us to see, okay, where are the gaps?
Where does it differ, and if we had to renegotiate those regulations, where should
we focus? But that’s harder to do than if you have no regulations at all, and then
you want to put something new in place. That’s a great opportunity to put
something new that is more aligned. So I’ve found that it works great, but it
works better in an environment where there is a lack of regulation and when you
are building together as opposed to trying to figure out a way to align something
that already exists.
PROFESSOR COVER: Yes.
CONGRESSWOMAN SUTTON: And if I might just add, on the issuance of
regulations, at the Seaway part of the flexibility that we have as a corporation is
that we issue joint regulations with our Canadian counterpart. It’s sort of a model
that can be looked at as extremely efficient and highly effective, I think, but it
works in many ways like what we heard described here with the Coast Guard,
because we are in constant interaction with our partners on the other side of the
border. We have joint strategic meetings; we have a lot of cooperation going on.
To the question of treaties, though, per se, the Boundary Waters Treaty, you
know, when that is sort of implicated in some kind of proposed changing action,
it can be complicated. We just watched, or we just experienced, a situation where
the International Joint Commission, which has members from both sides of the
border, looked at issues that impact the countries and the waters, and there has
been a study and attempts to change certain things for, I think, all of fifteen years
related to water levels for example.
So it can be complicated because you not only have the two nations, but you
have multiple agencies within each nation trying to work out how it impacts their
mission as an agency. I used to joke with the deputy at the St. Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation whose son was, I believe, in kindergarten when it first
started, and he’s now a junior in high school, but it’s done. So sometimes it takes
a while to work out, but always in a cooperative fashion.
REAR ADMIRAL RYAN: I mean, it’s not insignificant where 20 percent of
the planet’s fresh water is in the Great Lakes. So we’re also very attractive for
things like the West Coast who would like to have one big long straw right into
Lake Superior and pull all the water out, and then you start talking about lake
levels.
To Ms. Gascon’s point, you know, obviously, the lower the water, the less
commodities you can move, and it makes a [sic] safety and shipping and all
kinds of implications.
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PROFESSOR COVER: Well, I know we could talk so much longer, but I am
also mindful that we are pushing up against the lunch hour. So please join me in
thanking them, and then we are going to hear about the lunch hour.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: Thank you all, for your insight and
your time and attention. We’ll take about 25 minutes or so for lunch. Lunch is
just out these doors across the hallway. Box lunches are available, and then we
will reconvene back here to hear from Peter Bates from NORAD. Thank you so
much. (Luncheon recess taken.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (Afternoon Keynote - Peter G. Bates, Canadian
Political Advisor to the Commander, NORAD & U.S. Northern Command
(“USNORTHCOM”))
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: At this point, we will get the
afternoon started, so without any further ado, I present Dan Ujczo of Dickinson
Wright, one of our big supporters. Dan?
MR. UJCZO: Well, good afternoon again. I am Dan Ujczo, attorney, as Ted
said, with Dickinson Wright, and just very quickly, on behalf of my 500 closest
friends at Dickinson Wright located in 17 offices throughout the United States
and Canada, including right here in Ohio, it is our privilege to sponsor CUSLI. I
think it has been nine years running, if not more at this point, of the firm
sponsoring, and you know, the reasons are quite obvious. When you look at this
morning’s presentation, we find that the Canada-U.S. Law Institute, there is
really nothing like CUSLI, particularly at the moment. He left, but I was going to
say it’s also because Governor Blanchard tells us to sponsor, and when Governor
Blanchard says it, you do it; in the same way, when Jim Peterson and others
come here, and you spend your time and resources.
I will note just very quickly before introducing our keynote speaker that
while there are a handful of Canada-U.S. law firms out there, including some of
our great friends in the room, that we are one of the only ones that has been
headquartered in Detroit since the 1870s, has been in Ontario on Bay Street since
Confederation and places like Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Florida, and the
NAFTA corridor down to Texas, Arizona, and Nevada. And the reason why I
raise that isn’t just because at our conference you hear of process, process, y’all,
y’ins, those types of things. (Laughter.)
In fact, all of our southern offices, it’s our Kentucky one where you kind of
hear hee-haw, because I don’t know what it is about there, but that should be
interesting when our next ambassador to Canada, who hails from Lexington,
Kentucky, goes up there, you are going to hear a little bit different accent, I
think, than we have been used to with Bruce Heyman.
But most importantly, it means that we live and work in the communities
affected by the Canada-U.S. relationship, and we take that relationship quite
seriously. We not only support CUSLI, but we run a number of the Canada-U.S.
business associations located throughout the U.S. in places like Detroit, North
Carolina, Arizona, et cetera. And what we did in partnership with CUSLI last
year, and people like Chris Sands, Katie Friedman, and a number of others is, we
recognized that while our Canada-U.S. role is pretty incestuous, there is only
about 200 of us that run. We don’t really talk to each other that much. We aren’t
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very coordinated, and we knew whether a Republican or Democrat was in the
White House that we needed to get our act together, so we convened last June
under the banner of the U.S.-Canada Stage Group. Again, CUSLI was a proud
member of that. And all of the organizations started getting their act together. We
have been meeting monthly to prepare for this very contingency. Our next phase
right now is to do what we have talked about all morning, is the messaging on
the Canada-U.S. relationship because we have this cross-continental footprint.
We have more than 500 Canada-U.S. organizations and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Canadian Chamber, et cetera, et cetera, involved in this activity.
We envisioned in very short order that not only will there be, you know,
one-stop NAFTA workshops where members of Congress and the Canadian
government have members, the Mexican government will come and speak to all
of our members. But also, that we will be launching an all-trade personnel
initiative, that when Congress is in recess cross-continent, same-day, same-time
everybody, consistent messaging. Member U.S. and Canadian companies can
talk to their respective members of Congress in district about the importance of
the North American trade and Canada-U.S. in an effort to really change the
dynamic of what we heard today. And a key feature of discussion in the CanadaU.S. relationship as we saw in the earlier panel with our great example of our
United States Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard is the security relationship
between our two partners, and it starts with NAFTA and our keynote speaker this
luncheon session.
And there is perhaps nobody better than the political advisor to the
commander of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, Peter Bates. Peter has more than
two-and-a-half decades of service in the Canadian Foreign Service at the entity
formerly known as [the Department of External Affairs] now Global Affairs
Canada. He has served, prior to his most recent posting as the Deputy Director
for South Asia, India, and its neighbors; before that at embassies in Washington,
Moscow, Kiev, Cairo and was participant of the last team, one of the last
remaining folks that moved the Canadian embassy out of Tehran, was it about
2012? About that time, senior postings in Ottawa dealing with non-proliferation,
including Canada’s first deputy director for counterterrorism after 9/11, highly
regarded as part of the delegation in NATO among others on non-proliferation
issues, University of Toronto graduate as well as a graduate of the armor. And I
think perhaps most—where we thank you the most—is your service as a
Canadian Forces Reserve and decorated at that. So without further ado, I turn it
over to you, Peter, so we can hear about NAFTA. (Applause.)
MR. BATES: Thank you, all. Can you all hear me? Okay. First of all, I
would say I’m delighted to be here this afternoon to speak to you all and, frankly,
how surprised I was when I got the invitation. So I’d like to thank the organizers
for inviting me. When I first got the invitation, I thought, really? You want me?
Having heard the panels this morning, my question still remains. You want me?
(Laughter.)
But for the next little while, I am what you have, so thank you. Next year,
May 12, 2018, we will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the North American
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Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] where I currently work, a unique and
enduring part our international partnership and a unique and essential part of our
binational defense partnership. No other two countries on earth have ever done
what Canada and the United States have done, which is to say through NORAD
we’ve placed the defense and protection of our own citizens in our own territory
into the hands of another country.
On 9/11, America’s worst day, the commander who directed the air defense
effort, restored the security of American air space. Following those terrorist
attacks was a Canadian general officer in Colorado Springs, Major General Rick
Finland. At the time, General Finland was the director of operations of NORAD,
and today his name adorns the headquarters building at the Peterson Air Force
base along with his U.S. boss, the commander of NORAD at the time, General
Eberhart.
But we didn’t just establish NORAD to ensure our aerospace defense at
home putting a roof over a gated and insulated community here in North
America. What’s really cool about working at NORAD and USNORTHCOM is
when we created it, we did it to provide security at home so that together both the
United States and Canada could go out in the world and do what was needed, as
we did in World War II and Korea, as we did in the Balkans in the ‘90s and
Afghanistan more recently, and as we are today in Iraq and Syria. Two elements
have been key to NORAD’s continued success: the unshakeable partnership
between our two countries, United States and Canada, and NORAD’s continuing
to evolve and modernize in response to new opportunities.
I would like to speak first about that partnership. It’s often said that NORAD
is symbolic of the U.S.-Canada partnership, and we’ve heard about that today,
vital and enduring but invisible to most Canadians and Americans except on
Christmas Eve when we, at NORAD, track Santa, a vital function for children
around the world and is even more vital to their parents. Rather, I would contend
that NORAD is foundational to our defense and security partnership, and that our
defense partnership is fundamental to our relationship overall. Without the
experience of that decade-long defense partnership, I don’t see how we could
have advanced to the partnership that we have today that supports our beyondthe-border efforts and our continued share in prosperity, tomorrow and into the
future, as we have more than $2 billion dollars of goods and services across our
shared borders every day—how much more depending on which dollar you’re
counting on.
As Ambassador Heyman told us last night, Canada is the number one trading
partner for 35 American states directly supporting the employment of over nine
million Americans. We enjoy the most integrated, and secure continental
economy on earth, and the wealth generated by that economy directly supports
our defense and security, not only at home, but around the world. But it really
didn’t have to be that way. The unique relationship that our two countries shared
was neither inevitable nor was it preordained nor was it destined to last forever
without work. It’s far richer and more complex than that.
We have already seen reference this morning to perhaps the most famous
quotation on our bilateral relationship from President Kennedy’s address to the
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Parliament of Canada in 1961. These are probably the most quoted comments on
Canada-U.S. relations, but they are usually quoted in the short form. I would like
to take a few minutes today to give you the longer form of those remarks.
President Kennedy then said: “We share more than a common border. We share
a common heritage traced back to those early settlers who traveled from the
beachheads of the Maritime Provinces and New England to the far reaches of the
Pacific Coast . . . . We share common values from the past, a common defense
line at present, and common aspirations in the future, our future, and, indeed, the
future of all mankind. Geography has made us neighbors; history made us
friends; economics has made us partners; and necessity has made us allies. Those
who nature hath so joined together, let no man put assunder.”
He then went on to say: “What unites us is far greater than what divides us.
The issues and irritants that inevitably affect all neighbors are a small deed in
comparison with the issues that we face together. Above all, the somber threat
now posed to the whole neighborhood of this continent, in fact, to the whole
community of nations. But our alliances born, not out of fear, but of hope. It is an
alliance that advances what we are for, as well as opposes what we are against.”
A decade later on April 14th, 1972, another president, President Richard
Nixon, also referred to here this morning, also addressed the Canadian
Parliament. What he said in his address was somewhat different. He said: “It’s
time for Canadians and Americans to move beyond the sentimental rhetoric from
the past. It’s time for us to recognize: that we have very separate identities; that
we have significant differences; and that nobody’s interests are furthered when
these realities are obscured.” Both of these observations about their relationship
are accurate. More importantly, both of them are, indeed, true.
What’s also true, it’s less remembered, is that President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Diefenbaker detested one another. President Nixon and Prime Minister
Trudeau didn’t have a better relationship. But again, the relationship between our
two countries is more important to both than these differences, even differences
between our leaders, a point to be remembered especially in turbulent and
tumultuous times.
I have already spoken about the long history of our men and women in
uniform serving and fighting together as allies around the world. I do also note
that individual Canadians and Americans have an even longer [history] serving
in each other’s wars. For example, in the 1960s and ‘70s, as thousands of young
American men moved to Canada to avoid service in Vietnam, an estimated
30,000 Canadian citizens crossed the border to volunteer for service with the
United States military in Southeast Asia.
But until the 20th century, Canadians and Americans mostly served on
opposite sides in our wars, the American Revolution, the War of 1812 or on both
sides in the American Civil War. It is interesting that the United States can
honestly claim victory in both the American Revolution and the War of 1812 by
successfully asserting and then defending our independence from each other. If
either of our countries had failed, then there would be no need to discuss the
Canadian-American relations today.
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The fundamental importance of our defense relationship highlights another
paradoxical aspect of our overall bilateral relationship. Americans do not
generally spend a lot of time or effort thinking about Canada, but you do spend a
lot of time thinking about defense. For our part, Canadians spend an inordinate
amount of time thinking and worrying, talking about the U.S. but very little time
worrying about defense. But it’s our common defense and NORAD’s role in that
common defense that’s so important for the relationship overall, because it
demonstrates 24/7, 365 unequaled—if unconscious—a level of trust and
confidence in each other. I have said to my uniform Canadian forces colleagues
in Colorado, much to their consternation and bewilderment, that even if NORAD
had no practical role, and let me assure you that we still do, it would still be
worth preserving as the embodiment of that trust and confidence between our
two countries.
But trust and confidence aren’t enough to sustain the relationship like the
one between Canada and the United States. Like any relationship, it also requires
a continuing commitment and attention from both sides. So let me turn now to
NORAD’s evolution and the evolution of North American defense.
When NORAD was first established in 1958, the primary aerospace threat to
America came from Soviet long-range bombers carrying nuclear gravity bombs
to drop in American and Canadian cities. The air defense battle then would have
been fought over the Great Lakes and just north of the Canada-U.S. border. So
from the outset, NORAD, Canada and the United States together have
endeavored to push that threat farther away, farther north, and farther from our
shores. To do this, we built systems of air defense radar across Canada and into
the Arctic.
In the 1980s, a threat of bombs was replaced by long-range cruise missiles,
still carried by the same long-range Soviet bombers. In response, in 1985,
Canada and the United States agreed on the North American Air Defense
Modernization Initiative, and through that program together constructed the
North Warning System, a new line of radar across the Arctic coast of Alaska and
Canada. Construction to 15 long-range and 39 short-range radars that make up
the North Warning System was completed in 1993. In addition to these new
radars, five new forward operating locations across the Canadian north were
established for NORAD fighters. These radars and these forward operating
locations, are still operating today. In 1991, the end of the Cold War seemed to
dispel the end of the NORAD aerospace defense mission, but while economies
were made and NORAD forces in readiness in both Canadian and the United
States were reduced, NORAD itself was retained like insurance just in case.
On September 11th, 2001, NORAD was forced to change our focus from
looking out at potential military threats to U.S. and Canada to looking in at the
terrorist threat to civil aviation. Today through Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD
remains prepared to respond to either threat from within or without, and that is a
mission that we, at NORAD, practice every day, Canadian and American airmen
flying together seamlessly across our borders over both our countries. In fact,
NORAD established and pioneered a level of operation integration that has
spread throughout the joint forces. 1996 was the first time in a modern period a
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foreign warship was fully integrated into a U.S. carrier battle group. That
warship was a Canadian frigate, HMCS Regina. When she served with the task
group, she became known as the USS Regina, the USS part being obvious, and
the Regina because, frankly, the task force commander thought “vagina”
sounded dirty. (Laughter.)
The original 1958 NORAD agreement went for ten years with a possibility
to extend it further. Between 1968 and 2000, the agreement was reviewed,
revised, and renewed nine times. In 2006, Canada and the United States agreed
to finally commit to this relationship, and we renewed the NORAD agreement in
perpetuity. At that time, we also agreed to the three NORAD missions that
continue to this day: aerospace warning, surveillance, and warning of aerospace
threats to Canada and the United States, including from ballistic missiles from
anywhere in the world; aerospace controls, the active defense of North American
air space when attacked by aircraft or cruise missiles; and finally, maritime
warning, surveillance, and warning [of] maritime threats to Canada and the
United States.
Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War didn’t actually mean the end of
history, and the new century has brought with it new and renewed challenges.
The spread of terrorism by violent extremism, the proliferation of cruise and
ballistic missile capabilities, increased competition among major powers and
reduced respect for international norms and international values and international
order.
It has also brought with it the return of an old dispute in a new form. Russia
today still possesses the unique ability to threaten our attack of North America
with both ballistic and cruise missiles from air and sea. Since 2008, Russia has
also adopted a much more belligerent attitude towards the United States and its
allies, including Canada. Well, Russia today is still flying the same long-range
“Bear” bombers that NORAD was created to counter. Today’s TU-95 bombers
are more modernized and much improved. Additionally, they are now equipped
to carry extremely long-range and load servable nuclear and conventional Cruise
missiles. They’re flown by evermore competent and experienced air crews.
Even more troubling, in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, Russia has
demonstrated both the capability and a propensity to deploy military force and to
deploy in new and unexpected ways. The little green men who seized Crimea, for
example, or more critically from the NORAD perspective the use of long-range
bombers to conduct strikes with long-range cruise missiles into Syria. NORAD’s
days have all been to meet these and other challenges and to position ourselves to
take advantage of new opportunities and new technologies. We’re experimenting
with new plans, new strategies, and new organizational concepts.
In last year’s Vigilant Shield, our annual war fighting exercise, we sent
NORAD aircraft to Thule, Greenland, for the first time to test what contribution
that might make to air surveillance and control in the high north. Last night,
Ambassador Heyman proposed joint work on replacing the North Warning
System, and I’m pleased to tell you all here today that that work has already
begun. The United States and Canada have already established a binational
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steering group to manage the eventual replacement of the North Warning
System, our network of surveillance radar across the Alaska coast and northern
Canada. The North American Air Defense Modernization Program in the 1980s
and 1990s that gave us the end of the U.S. North Warning System was our last
major capital binational investment in NORAD infrastructure. That investment
has served us well, but the North Warning System is getting old, and in a new
century both demands and will provide new capabilities.
For the first time ever, the United States has agreed to undertake a binational
analysis of alternatives with Canada to explore surveillance systems for all
domain situational awareness of the northern approaches to North America.
They’ve never done that with any other ally. This analysis will inform decisions
both in Washington and Ottawa on appropriate technology investments to make,
to give NORAD that system of systems for next generation all domain
surveillance capabilities. The North Warning System needs to be replaced, but it
can’t be replaced one for one. There are new ways, space bay sensors, other
technologies that will have to be employed, one, for reasons of cost and, two, for
reasons of capability.
Since its creation in 1958, NORAD has always been paired with a partner
U.S. Command, an initiative that was Continental Air Defense Command, which
became Air Defense Command. Later it was U.S. Space Command, which
merged with Strike Command, and since 2002, our partner has been
USNORTHCOM. Like NORAD, NORTHCOM has three missions: homeland
defense to the United States; defense support for civil authorities, responding to
disasters, both natural and manmade; and third, theater security cooperation with
the Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico. While NORAD and NORTHCOM missions
are complementary, they are distinct and different and based on very different
authorities.
But one of the issues we face within the headquarters is since 2002 that
NORAD and NORTHCOM have become increasingly integrated. Today we
have only one operational director that is separate. We have a J-3 operations
director for NORAD and an operations director for NORTHCOM. All of the
other directors inside of the headquarters are fully integrated. What that means,
effectively, is there are Canadians in NORAD billets and common directorates
that are doing some of NORTHCOM’s work, and we are happy to do it. It is
covered by the agreement. But at the same time, it is important to maintain the
distinctions from what we agreed to do bi-nationally through NORAD and what
we need to do bilaterally, and that involves NORTHCOM’s cooperation with
Canadian drug operations command.
So for example, in my two-and-a-half years in headquarters the question of
support across the border often comes up. There’s the U.S. military that come to
the support of Canada across our shared border. I’ve had the commander look at
me, point and say, “so we’re good. Do we go?” And I go, “No, sir, we got this.
We’re good with this one.” I’ve heard senior members of the staff, actually much
to my chagrin, with the best will in the world, say you know, from a
NORTHCOM perspective responding to these types of disasters, there is no
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border. I have to go up to the general officer actually, sir, there is a border. It’s
there for a reason, and it’s serving both of us very, very well.
For while Canada and the United States have agreed to a combined defense
over North American airspace, but not to a common ballistic missile defense,
maritime home and defense and land defense, for example, remain conducted
bilaterally. One challenge in working together for our common defense is not
limiting the freedom of action of Canada or the United States to taking battle
action if they consider it necessary.
Another challenge, particularly today, is how do you manage a coordinated
multi-domain defense of North America between Canada and the United States
of inner land, sea, space, and cyber, if required? We have a basic defense
document, we have a combined defense plan, but we do not have a single
comprehensive binational command scheme or organization. There’s no single
headquarters in Canada or the United States responsible for the overall defense
of our two countries. Instead, that mission is shared by NORAD,
USNORTHCOM, and our Canadian partner command Canadian Joint
Operations Command in Colorado Springs.
Across NORAD American and Canadian servicemen and women take pride
in serving together on one team, regardless of uniform, military service, or
nationality. We have the watch, and with our colleagues in USNORTHCOM, we
truly are two commands with a common privilege. We’re preparing new
innovative plans for an even more effective combined defense of our nations
involving NORAD, USNORTHCOM, Canadian Joint Operations Command, and
U.S. partner commands and allies outside of North America.
The first objective of these plans in the first instance is to deter attack against
Canada or the United States from whatever direction and where necessary to
successfully defend our nations and our fellow citizens. What we can’t deter, we
can’t defend. This is an exciting time at NORAD and USNORTHCOM as we
face these challenges together. What’s more, this spirit of partnership extends
across the defense and security relationship, and it views our bilateral
relationship as a whole. We literally have each other’s backs. Some years ago
when I was working on the job, I heard a story about our border service agents.
Before we chose to arm our Canadian service agents on the border, an inebriate
and somewhat belligerent American citizen presented himself at the entry points.
He was refused admission to Canada. He returned to his truck, somewhat irked,
picked up an axe, and headed back to the border. The U.S. customs and border
protection agent who was on duty, and was armed, stepped out of his office, saw
the citizen coming up the road and said, “Excuse me, sir. Where do you think
you are going?” And he said, “Well, I am going to go and teach that Canadian a
lesson.” The American border officer smiled and gentlemanly said, “No, you are
not. Go home and sleep it off.”
It’s said that we can’t choose our family. We can only choose our friends.
Canada and the United States are family, literally. There are hundreds of
thousands of people who moved back and forth across our border over the
centuries. It is estimated today that more than a million Canadians live here in
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the United States and between one and two million Americans live in Canada. I
would like to offer another personal example from my time at USNORTHCOM
and NORAD. When I joined the command in 2007, the NORTHCOM deputy
commander was a U.S. lieutenant general from the State of Vermont, General
Michael Dubie. General Dubie’s family had moved from Canada some years
previously, well before his birth. He still had family in Quebec where they are
known as “Doob-ay.”
Together, as I said before, we have built the most integrated and innovative
secure continental countries on the planet. We have the most intimate and
effective military relationship of any two nations on earth, but let me repeat, it
didn’t have to be that way. It requires constant work and attention. External
factors have encouraged our defense cooperation, but they have not demanded.
Instead, as friends, we have chosen deliberately to pursue it, and as friends, we
must continue to consciously work at it.
That’s why I am so pleased to be at this conference today, because it is very
clear what we’re doing in this room. What you have been doing through this
forum is contributing overall to that relationship. Each of us, Canadian and
American, contributes to a relationship, to a partnership between the United
States and Canada that is unique and valuable in the world, not just to ourselves,
but it is a relationship that was never inevitable, and it should never be taken for
granted. That said, we shouldn’t shy away from our disagreements. We have
disagreed before on nuclear weapons, on antipersonnel land mines, on ballistic
missile defense, on the war in Vietnam, and on the war in Iraq. We will disagree
again as friends.
So where is the defense relationship going? Sometime later this year the
Canadian government will issue its defense policy review. Sometime after that,
the U.S. Government is expected to release a strategic defense review. In the
mandate letter that was received from the Prime Minister, one of the key items
for his attention was the bilateral defense relationship with the United States,
which is so essential to both of our countries. It’s a relation which has extended
beyond defense and into security but at the same time would be balancing both
sovereignties and the separate legal jurisdictions that we have on both sides of
our shared border. I would like to think that up until the 20th century borders
were the lines that separated sovereignty.
What 9/11 has demonstrated and what our experience shows is that borders
are increasingly the place where countries have to plug in most effectively as we
heard in the presentations from U.S. Coast Guard and Canadian Coast Guard.
The border now is where we have to work effectively together to protect both of
our populations and our economies, and quite frankly, it is an area which Canada
and the United States present an example to the world, and again, it is not just a
benefit to ourselves but a benefit to others.
On that note, I would like to thank you for your attention. And I would be
happy to take any questions for any time remaining. (Applause.)
MR. BATES: Please.
MR. HORNBY: You noted that there will be a defense review that will be
released sometime in the coming months. Do you think that Canada is going to
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review the decision to participate in the ballistic missile defense in North
America, particularly [because] the times have changed considerably from the
era of Star Wars when president Reagan was in power, and there are new threats
such as North Korea?
MR. BATES: I actually know for a fact that a review of the decisions with
regard to ballistic missile defense is inside the [Defense Policy Review
(“DPR”)]. As of now, a decision hasn’t been made as of which way to go. A lot
of people say that the ballistic missile defense in Canada has always been
political. That’s why we said no in 2005.
Reviewing the record, I would like to go further back and point out we
actually said no to North American ballistic missile defense multiple times since
1968, and that our objections to missile defense have always rested on three
components. One, we weren’t sure the technology would work in ‘05 when we
made the decision the technology was new. I can tell you that my colleagues in
NORTHCOM are quite confident in the ability in the existing system to deal
with the threat that it was designed to deal with. So the technology is proven, but
thankfully so, not proven for actual use. The second was: Was it worth the
money? Our American colleagues have already spent over $50 billion dollars in
a ground-based interceptor, and from a Canadian defense perspective, that’s a
huge amount of money. Do we in Canada think that our defense dollars will go
into that or go into an exhibition, expanding special-forces capability? So that’s
going to be part of the debate. The third part of the question for Canadians has
always been what will be the effect of U.S. ballistic missile defense on other
countries, particularly Russia and China. I would argue that Chinese force
modernization and force expansion was a direct response to the deployment of
the BPIs after ‘05. That, however, has already happened, so that’s in the past.
So I would say it is the, it’s one of the big reasons why I can only say that
the DPR will come out later this year. I understand it is one of the big points that
is still being debated in Ottawa, and we are waiting to see how that comes out. I
can say, however, in the current circumstances NORAD does the ballistic missile
warning function. We tell both the United States and Canada whether there is
ballistic missiles north [of] North America, so when the Koreans are testing their
missiles as they have been more frequently this year, NORAD will make a
determination as to whether that poses a threat to North America. If it did, we
would then hand over the active defense machine of NORTHCOM, and that
happens seamlessly, and my colleagues at NORTHCOM will take the shot.
We have a good relationship, the system works the way it is right now, so
that the last possible outcome will be one in which we complicate the situation in
that we already have a situation that works for both countries. Sir?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you speak a little bit more to the cyber—where
you are now, and how involved you have to be? That’s a new threat.
MR. BATES: I can speak to cyber. A previous commander was very
interested in NORAD taking over a cyber-warning machine. However, insofar as
the manner in which cyber has evolved in both the Canadian forces and U.S.
services, you have [U.S. Cyber Command (“CYBERCOM”)]. Canadian forces,
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we are establishing our own cyber organization as well, so for right now, the
NORAD mission and the NORTHCOM mission is defined by my commander,
General [Lori J.] Robinson. We are responsible for defending our own networks.
That’s all we are required to do, and frankly, that is all we are resourced to do.
The rest of it we leave to CYBERCOM.
Now, that said, when I spoke about the partners that we have, [U.S. Strategic
Command
(“USSTRATCOM”)],
[U.S.
Transportation
Command
(“USTRANSCOM”)], [U.S. Utility Command (“USUTCOM”)], [ U.S. Cyber
Command (“USCYBERCOM”)] is going to be one of our partners in defense in
North America if we ever actually have to execute that mission. We have a very
close relationship with CYBERCOM on some of these aspects. We have an even
closer relationship with Canadian forces in USCYBERCOM.
One of the great things about our relationship, the quality of our relationship,
the defense partnership is we have led the way for other acts. One of the
questions I heard asked this morning was: Does the U.S. want friends and allies
or not? I mean, that’s a big question. The Secretary of War has been talking
about a third offset strategy to maintain American military friends around the
world, looking at technology. I’ve argued, and will continue to argue, the major
advantage the United States has with respect to any potential adversary, whether
it is Russia, China, or somebody else is the United States is the only major power
that actually has allies. Despite the enormous amounts of money the United
States has invested in defense, you can’t do everything. So allies like Canada,
one, we provide capabilities that are needed; we can provide access and ability in
countries where it is harder for America to operate such as places in Africa, for
example, and the folks that we bring in on the cyber side and on the space side.
We’re doing the same thing on the space side, coming up with a new, finalized
capability to manage space defense, cyber defense in a coordinated way across
our allied partnership, which is going to be so important, not just to the United
States and Canada, but for all of us.
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR PARRAN: Thank you so much. At this point,
can we just give Peter another hand? (Applause.)
We’re running a little late, so if we can just take a five-minute break, stretch
the legs, restroom, and reconvene back here for our next panel. Thank you.
(Recess had.)

